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Attacks against mobile systems have escalated over the past decade. There have been
increases of fraud, platform attacks, and malware. The Internet of Things (IoT) offers a
new attack vector for Cybercriminals. M2M contributes to the growing number of
devices that use wireless systems for Internet connection. As new applications and
platforms are created, old vulnerabilities are transferred to next-generation systems.
There is a research gap that exists between the current approaches for security framework
development and the understanding of how these new technologies are different and how
they are similar. This gap exists because system designers, security architects, and users
are not fully aware of security risks and how next-generation devices can jeopardize
safety and personal privacy. Current techniques, for developing security requirements,
do not adequately consider the use of new technologies, and this weakens
countermeasure implementations. These techniques rely on security frameworks for
requirements development. These frameworks lack a method for identifying next
generation security concerns and processes for comparing, contrasting and evaluating
non-human device security protections. This research presents a solution for this
problem by offering a novel security framework that is focused on the study of the
“functions and capabilities” of M2M devices and improves the systems development life
cycle for the overall IoT ecosystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Ecosystems take various forms, including social ecosystems, software ecosystems,
and technological ecosystems. According to Jiang and ShiWei (2010), these systems are
made up of units consisting of various parts and factors that work together to contribute
knowledge, make connections, and follow behaviors to form a community. In recent
years, the research community focused on emerging technologies that make up the
Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem.
The Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem is often labeled by one of the following
industry buzzwords, the Machine-to-Machine (M2M) ecosystem, the Industrial Internet,
or the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) ecosystem. However, industry buzzwords lead to
confusion (Casson & Della Giusta, 2014). In the literature, these terms are sometimes
used interchangeably, while at other times they are used to describe distinct concepts
(Conti, 2006; Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2010; Severi et al., 2014). The Internet of Things
is the more predominant, broader concept describing where the physical world merges
with the digital world.
IoT evolved from M2M and other technologies including the Cellular Networks,
Location Based Services and the supervisory control and data acquisition system
(SACDA). The IoT is an idea, an architectural framework for where all things are
connected over a network. The M2M ecosystem is where the machines communicate
with other physical machines as connected and networked devices within the IoT. These
machines as devices, are a collection of sensors, smart switches, meters, network
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gateways, and controllers that are connected together to collect information and transfer
that information to a processing point, with little to no human user interaction (Chui,
Loffler, & Roberts, 2010). The focus of this research is on the devices that make up the
M2M ecosystem.
As explained by Wu et al., (2011), M2M ecosystems can be found in many
domains, such as consumer services (smart home technologies, consumer electronics,
connected car, etc.), manufacturing, healthcare, energy (smart metering and grids), and
transportation (asset tracking and vehicle to vehicle communications). In all, there are 16
critical national infrastructure domains as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (Vugrin, Warren, Ehlen, & Camphouse, 2010).
The recent growth of M2M attributed to several compounding factors, including
global Internet reach, growth and expansion of mobile networks, the growing maturity of
ipv6 and the capillary architecture of meshed networks (Marcovici, 2014). Other key
factors have been the rapid evolution of smartphones, tablets, and supporting
technologies, along with the dropping prices of sensors, actuators, and processors.
Technology leaders and research firms such as Cisco, Machina Research, ABI Research,
and IBM estimate that the future M2M/IoT connected embedded node-base will number
upwards of 50 billion devices within the next 5 to 7 years (Murar & Brad, 2014). Some
forecasts estimate more than one trillion devices will be connected by 2025.
It is believed that the M2M ecosystem will evolve through three distinct stages.
Stage one involves getting more devices onto the network. Stage one is where we are
today. Stage two is true automation among devices without human interventions. Stage
three is “building applications on top of connected devices,” so that things interact and
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are tied together seamlessly (Chang, 2014; Latvakoski et al., 2014). Researchers expect
that M2M ecosystems will track and interact with all aspects of life in the future. As a
result of the evolution of M2M, its pervasive nature, the convergence of physical and
cyber worlds, and the implications of devices taking action without human intervention,
M2M security is critical to safeguard our national security as much as our personal
security (Rubin, Lynch, Escaravage, & Lerner, 2014).
Understanding Machine to Machine
Machine to Machine or (M2M) is a term that refers to computing devices (sensors,
actuators, and gateways) that are interconnected, communicate with each other, supply
information to upstream systems, and have the capability to collaborate and act in the
physical world, primarily without human intervention (Boswarthick, Elloumi, & Hersent,
2012). As M2M ecosystems are deployed within various domains, there will be a natural
evolution for these domains to interact with each other. For example, a connected car
system may interact with a smart home system to trigger events within the home as the
car pulls into the driveway. The growth of wireless networks, as well as the rise of
smartphones, tablets, and supporting technology, will continue to fuel the growth of
devices in the wireless domain. However, most M2M communications ecosystems will
include a mix of both wired and wireless communication mechanisms and a cluster of
Meshed capillary local networks and worldwide reaching long-range networks.
M2M Service Categories
M2M is divided into two service categories: Finished services and Ad-hoc services.
A service provider manages “Finished” services from end-to-end over secured transport
mechanisms that may or may not be dedicated to the service (Kim, Wei, & Lee, n.d.).
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Ad-hoc services, on the other hand, are not formally supported by the provider and are
supported by an individual entity, such as a consumer, small business, or open
community, and are run over the open Internet (Niyato, Xiao, & Wang, 2011). Due to
lack of centralized management, monitoring, and processes in-place, ad-hoc services
provide greater security risks.
M2M Ecosystem Samples
There are many types of M2M ecosystems that span a multitude of industry
verticals, including energy, manufacturing, consumers, and transportation. Some
examples of prevalent M2M ecosystems that illustrate the pervasive nature of its
application include the following.


Connected car: GM OnStar was one of the first applications to use basic voice
support services and vehicular troubleshooting. It evolved with new services,
such as anti-theft remote engine kill and more sophisticated diagnostics. It is now
possible to use smart phones to access the car to check the battery life and locate
or unlock the car; entertainment packages are being added as well. In the future,
cars will communicate with other cars and traffic control centers for collision
avoidance and congestion control. The concept of driverless cars is also fast
becoming a reality (Chan, 2011).



Healthcare: Kim et al., (n.d.) explains that M2M technology has a major impact
on the healthcare sector; M2M applications are already in use in hospitals and
medical facilities and by individual healthcare professionals. Additional verticals
include remote patient monitoring, functionality, maintenance system controls,
and patient records storage. Connected devices monitor a patient’s condition
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worldwide, so that a radiologist in New York can view and diagnose a patient’s
broken leg in the French Alps and interact remotely with other doctors. Medical
equipment with sensors for Smart IVs, monitor and change medicine dosage for a
patient, which automatically helps nurses and doctors to provide better patient
care. Electronic records are updated in real-time, providing caregivers with up-todate treatment information.


Wearable devices: Wearable devices for real-time tracking of the vital signs of
self-trackers and medical providers are already available in the market. The next
invention is likely to be subcutaneous sensors; any of these devices could easily
network with medical devices such as insulin pumps and pacemakers (Seong,
Lee, & Kang, 2014).



Smart Grid: The smart grid technology streamlines energy production and
distribution. For example, connected devices in a house are networked with
neighborhood hubs that perform centralized processing to manage the local
energy use, to reduce usage, to power storage requirements, and to provide realtime availability updates (Sharma & Akhouri, 2014). Intelligence is added to
devices that plug into the grid. This allows the electrical grid to anticipate
potential supply and distribution issues. Working in concert with smart devices
and smart meters, the smart grid can automatically coordinate electrical usage and
notify devices to reduce consumption or perform tasks after peak loads subside
(López, Moura, Moreno, & Camacho, 2014).



Smart infrastructure and cities: Sensors added to roadways, bridges, buildings,
and transmission towers provide regular updates concerning the state of use and
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wear and tear on these structures, thus allowing for maintenance planning and
usage control. While humans using sensor data in a traffic control center today
manage traffic flow, the natural evolution will be smart roads and bridges that
communicate with smart traffic control devices to control traffic flow
automatically (Elmangoush, Steinke, Al-Hezm, & Magedanz, 2014).


Smart home: Consumers have begun to automate day-to-day experiences within
the home. Many electric and electronic appliances can now be wired or
connected wirelessly to a central control system and gateway. These control
systems provide the homeowner with the ability to manage various devices such
as alarm clocks, coffee makers and even the toaster. Automation includes
window shades that rise on command and thermostats that set temperature based
on the occupant’s movement. Home security already leverages M2M; networks
of sensors and devices take action based on owner-defined rules. Homeowners
use mobile phones to control electronic home appliances and utilities by applying
intelligence techniques. These intelligent things learn to connect and
communicate without human interaction (Hosek, et al., 2014). This is rapidly
evolving to automated tasks or notifications that occur when the user is outside of
the home. For example, if you rush out of your home late for work, you might
receive a message on your smartphone that you left the doors unlocked. You
could take an action remotely to lock the doors and arm the alarm system.



Asset and cargo tracking: Knowing the real-time location of goods is critical for
many industries. Small M2M devices such as RFID tags and GPS modules can
be attached to assets and cargo containers to allow suppliers, shippers, and owners
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to track their high-value assets across multiple transportation methods, including
the shipping containers and even the cargo bay of an aircraft. M2M devices can
be attached to a high value asset that enables the end user to track the location of
the asset. According to Jordan (2014), automated shipping ports will use
container attached M2M devices to track the location of containers, load
containers on the appropriate ships and trucks, and automatically redirect
containers based on customer needs. In addition, asset tracking supports
inventory controls. For example, field equipment such as tractors and mowers are
monitored for location and condition. Two mowers placed along the highway
communicate with each other to avoid overlapping coverage and collision
hazards. For shipping, M2M devices, combined with GPS location, enables
updated condition notices, such as refrigerated van temperature. For inventory
and vending machine, product expiration, service and maintenance needs are
transferred to the distribution center and orders are automatically filled (Jordan,
2014).
Conclusion
M2M ecosystems will continue to evolve from reporting and telematics to a state
where collaboration between devices, as well as between M2M ecosystems, will create
actions in the physical world that occurs without human intervention. There will be
billions of connected devices into which we may or may not have visibility and these
systems and devices will be taking on greater and greater responsibilities which will have
a significant human impact based on their proper operation. Because of this, it is critical
that a sound security methodology is applied to secure the overall IoT Ecosystem.
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Problem Statement
The M2M ecosystem is not secured by present information security policy (Lake,
Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2014). A research gap is present where current security
frameworks fail to address needed protections for next generation systems like M2M.
Present frameworks do not adequately consider next-generation threats from a system or
device that is non-human driven, which weakens countermeasure implementations and
security guideline development (Wash, 2010). There is a lack of sufficient research on
the intersection of human interface, wireless, and M2M device risks and security
countermeasures (Riahi, et al., 2014). Presently, security for M2M is based on current
mobile systems’ security frameworks. It is unknown how these frameworks will measure
up against emerging threats, unknown vulnerabilities, and new devices in an automated
and self-reacting system like M2M (Ennesser, 2012).

Dissertation Goal
The goal of this research was to develop a framework that evaluates Machine-toMachine (M2M) device security. The purpose was to seek out and solve the stated
problem by developing a novel security framework that is focused on validating the study
of the “functions” of M2M devices, based on the tested “capabilities” of such devices and
then improve the development life cycle processes in the M2M ecosystem. This effort (a)
adequately considered restrictions and constraints; (b) identified significant shortfalls;
and (c) led to a more thorough and detailed M2M Security Framework. Other existing
methodologies do not provide a representation of what or which M2M system
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components should be secured based on the function they perform (Godfrey et al., 2015).
A framework approach that identifies devices, components, and functions that are harmed
when left vulnerable helps to direct ecosystem-design principles and generates better
security recommendations (Molotsi & Tait, 2013). Weaknesses in any security
framework, or the lack of such a framework, threatens the overall protection of the
system, because these jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
endpoint device; where the system is most exposed.
This research identified and defined the framework’s security controls, which
then offers possible improvements to authentication, authorization, data confidentiality,
integrity, accountability, session management, and transport security in order to mitigate
risk. Without sufficient knowledge of these controls, the functional requirements that are
created out of the framework will not satisfy architectural principles and good security
practice standards (Godfrey et al., 2015).
This goal was reached by first building a test platform that includes three M2M
devices connected to a device-management system for command and control. System’s
development, research and testing was completed by modifying, adapting, and applying
testing techniques as described by the Open Web Application Security Project, Mobile
Security and OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Projects (OWASP, 2014). Although the
OWASP project is dedicated to web application security, all testing methods effectively
offer guidelines for evaluating the security of computer systems and networks. Utilizing
these methods led to the validation and verification of the effectiveness of a security
framework for M2M and the development of a new, comprehensive M2M security
framework that addresses the uniqueness of this technology.
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Relevance and Significance
The Internet of Things (IoT) running M2M devices is completely changing
today’s computing environment (Chen, 2013). IoT is best described as the connection of
people to people, people to machines, and machines to machines, or as the idea of all
objects connected to the Internet (Tan & Wang, 2010). M2M devices are the hardware
device component sub-section of IoT and a collection of sensors, smart devices, network
nodes, and controllers that are connected together to collect information and transfer that
information to a processing point with little to no human user interaction (Chui, Loffler,
& Roberts, 2010). Chen explains that these sensors can listen and talk in ways that
humans cannot. It is believed that M2M will improve human life by helping to save
money, forecast weather, predict events, and will provide an overall safer environment
(Chen, 2012). However, there is a lack of study about the effects on security and privacy
of humans not monitoring, controlling, maintaining, or policing the ecosystem (Dahl &
Holbo, 2012).
Many mobility trends today lack properly designed security and privacy
requirements. For example, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) and the push to move
security responsibility to the end user are exposing new issues for security and privacy
(Armando, Costa, & Merlo, 2013). According to Armando et al. (2013), corporations are
finding that security policies geared toward traditional desktop protections are antiquated
and ineffective. A modernized approach is needed to protect the swiftly moving
workforce from the environments offering information anywhere, at any time, and with
any device (Lu, et al., 2011). If the exchange of information or content is unprotected,
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confidentiality and privacy are lost. Next-generation devices, such as those used in
M2M, will help control connected environments and will provide a link to mobile
systems, smart cities, and various sensor networks; therefore, the people using these
platforms must protect all the information thereon (Kriesten, Tünnermann, Mertes, &
Hermann, 2010). Enterprise IT policies protect corporate information only if the users
abide by the rules set in place (Harris, 2009). With the increase of attacks on personal
mobile devices, companies have experienced an increased loss of protected data and
compromise of company networks. These same vulnerabilities threaten the M2M
ecosystem.
According to Constantinos, Coursaris, and Kim (2011), all mobile environments
lack an effective way to understand how the user will implement various applications.
The researchers state that present mobility requirement frameworks lack functional tasks
understandings and how capabilities drive the ability to protect. This lack allows
malicious users to subvert existing requirements and presents designs that cannot change
when the user defines a new way to apply the technology. Conventional requirements
inadequately design mobile interfaces and applications to fit particular contextual
settings, and are not flexible (Constantinos, et al., 2011). Requirements of the
engineering process in M2M fail because there is no consideration of activities taking
place for the development of threatening scenarios. Therefore, risk management and
applied testing processes should be incorporated into security frameworks for devices in
ecosystems such as M2M (Caruso & Masters, 2014). This study exposes the failing
points of present techniques by identifying specific task failures and proves that a new
approach is more effective. It explores the device from the view of dynamic factors to
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reveal how this impact usability may contribute to effective security design, as
recommended by Constantinos, et al., (2011).
Wireless carriers force robust security wrappers around devices in order to
address the lack of protected access, at the risk of violating the privacy of the owner of
the device (Enck et al., 2014). These solutions put the network operator in control of the
user owned devices; the operator has access to the device, to personal user data, to user
location, and to specific networks and applications. Once on the network, the device’s
policy and provisioning capabilities are subject to security automation (Enck et al., 2014).
Wireless system security is complex. Identifying behavioral patterns reduces the
complexity and exposes common functions, which leads to more effective requirements
and reusable design practices. However, in M2M, the access to the device, user personal
data, user location, and even specific networks and applications is automated and hidden.
User side protections are limited, and thus security frameworks are limited (Saedy &
Mojtahed, 2011). IoT and M2M communications make information available through
crowd and information base; this calls for a shift toward information controls beyond
network policy in order to protect the unaware benefactor (TalebiFard, Nicanfar, Hu, &
Leung, 2013).

Barriers and Issues
In order to successfully complete this research, the study had to ensure that the
new framework proved to be a value-added process for users and ecosystem owners. The
Internet of Things (IoT) is a concept where physical objects all connect to the Internet.
Because M2M devices are the physical part of the IoT, one framework does not
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guarantee that all objects are secure. This barrier required that we narrowed the quickly
changing environment down to one specific “thing”, such as a set of devices performing a
specific “task”. To mitigate this challenge, the study focused on three prototyped M2M
devices that fulfilled the specific tasks and function, such as location and device control
required by the driving use cases. For each task, security controls were tested, changed
and analyzed, depending on the failure or success of the increased control. These efforts
led to the final framework development and validation.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
A limitation of this study was that the M2M ecosystem use cases did not clearly
defined the required security requirements required by the business logic. Also, the
insufficient research did not address how tiny machines will function in various
categories and environments. Several delimitations exist regarding the scope of the
review and test platform. M2M devices change quickly and commercial devices are
limited and untested, the prototyped devices required alteration to comply with the
Command and Control Center and testing tools are limited and mostly available for only
smartphone evaluation. In addition, all testing was “feasibility” in nature and sought out
possible attack points as defined by past research and executed attack scenarios.

Definition of Terms
Autonomic computing. Is where devices and systems are operating in a self-managing
computing model.
Actuator. Is a device that performs action and output.
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Application. Is typically software that is designed to perform specific task for a desired
outcome.
Capability. Is where the ability to do something is recognized and determined.
Controller. Is an object that controls actuators.
Device. Is any embedded electronic computing equipment that collects data for
actuators and sensors for communications.
Function. Is where the purpose or activity for which a thing exists and is used is
recorded.
Gateway. Is equipment with electronic computing and communication capability is
used for transferring information within networks.
Internet of Things (IoT). An idea where objects, animals or people are seen as unique
identifiers connected together over a network.
Machine to Machine (M2M). Is the concept and systems design where devices
communicate to each other without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer
interaction.
M2M sensor. Is the device that detects and responds to specific inputs such as motion,
moisture and pressure.
M2M Service Provider. Is an entity, such as a company, that provides network
connectivity.
M2M Ecosystem. Is an area network that provides connectivity between M2M devices.
M2M Communications Network. Is the physical telecommunications used to exchange
data between entities, such as devices, gateways and network infrastructures.
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RFID (radio frequency identification). Is a technology and devices that uses
electromagnetic radio frequency (RF) to output the identity of an object, animal, or
person.
Secured Environment. Is where enabling secure execution of functions is place in an
ecosystem
Smart Grid. Is a generic label for the electricity distribution system.
Thing. Is simply an identifiable element located in an environment that is connected to
other things for the purpose of intelligence transfer.
Use Case. Is a model that describes a system function from the point of view an actor.

List of Acronyms
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Internet of Things (IoT)
Intrusion detection systems (IDS).
Machine-to-Machine (M2M)
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET)
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Wireless sensor networks (WSN)
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Summary
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the current operational M2M
ecosystems. It presents the technical definition of the IoT, and then introduces the M2M
security problem that needed to be addressed at the time of this research. Also, described
are the innovation and novelty of M2M devices; these platforms and applications call for
unique security requirements and design. The chapter summarizes some of the
challenges of M2M security and gaps in the literature. At its end, the chapter introduces
the goal of the research preformed to develop a framework that evaluates Machine-toMachine device security.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) devices are comprised of inexpensive sensors that are
deployed across many different domains. These include smart power grids, vehicular
telematics, information management, medical and health services, and smart home
networks (Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014). Because M2M devices will eventually be
included in all objects, including books, televisions, bikes, cars, and homes, the large
amount of data is a security risk in itself (Shafiq, et al., 2013). The data collected is
stored in unknown locations within the cloud and can disclose information about
individuals, such as buying pattern, locations, communication activities, and even health
data. M2M device costs fall in the region of $1 to $200. They have a wide range of
applications for different industry sectors, which makes them an inexpensive option for
business technologies. M2M devices are unsupervised and placed in a variety of
locations, which provides hackers access to individual devices and exposes them to theft,
reuse, and fraud (Chen & Ma, 2014). As the M2M market grows, researchers expect that
the number of fraudulent uses of these devices will grow.
Mobile devices such as smartphones, tablets, sensors, and laptop computers have
become tools for everyday life. However, because users of these devices are not fully
aware of security risks, the devices are used in ways that may jeopardize the user’s safety
and personal privacy (Kanuparthi, Karri, & Addepalli, 2013). Attacks against mobile
devices have escalated due to an increase of fraud, development of malware specific to
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mobile devices, and the heightened interest of cyber-crooks (Murynets & Piqueras Jover,
2012). Mobile devices are full of sensitive information about users and the companies
that employs them; this vital intelligence can be used to gain access to internal business
and personal networks and systems (McAfee, 2011). Mobile devices are no longer just
targets for low-level hackers, but are also the targets of criminals seeking to steal
personal and business communications and data (Murphy & Murphy, 2013). M2M
networks and devices have little or no user interaction, but the same vulnerabilities will
threaten these systems (Kim, He, Thottan, & Deshpande, 2014).
The fundamental premise of this shift in technology is not only to integrate data for
greater efficiency, but also to develop the means by which to link goods and services to
consumers and users in strategic marketing and engagement (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito,
2010). Despite this fundamental premise, there are many additional facets to the purpose
of M2M. In essence, the process breaks down the barriers between digital and physical
objects (Kortuem et al., 2010). This can allow for greater connections and efficiencies in
the sale of such objects, in the use of educational resources, in the development of health
care objectives, and so on (Welbourne, et al., 2009).
At the same time, however, M2M introduces the means by which additional
challenges may occur. Issues of security, which is the ability of the system itself to
remain safe for users and for organizations, and of user control, which is the ability of a
user to have power over the user’s own identity and experience, are yet to be solved
(Sarma & Girão, 2009). It is evident that not all of the infrastructures for M2M systems
have been perfected to the point at which people know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that
their private information is being protected. It is clear that IoT ecosystem and all of the
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new technological tools that they present create issues for both business and personal
consumers when it comes to privacy. This literature review outlines the present
challenges for M2M systems within the context of smartphone technology. Because
smartphones share security protocols and networks with the M2M ecosystem, it is
important to draw on the smartphone literature and its application to newer M2M
technologies that have not been investigated as deeply in the existing research. The
literature review thus provides an assessment of current challenges within the M2M
security framework and examines the solutions proposed by the literature and concludes
with an assessment and summary of the literature.

A Definition of Security Frameworks
A security framework is a more comprehensive form of an information system’s
framework model. According to Alqassem (2014), these models ensure security by
examining vulnerabilities and eliminating risk. A complete security framework includes
several essential elements in terms of technological applications, people, usages,
processes, policies, guidelines, business logic and strategies (Ohki, et al., 2009). To be of
value, a comprehensive security framework must include:
• Proper practices and execution of policies,
• Sound controls of people, processes, and technologies,
• Analysis of risk,
• Acceptable options or alternatives,
• Have an implementation guide,
• Provide a method to test compliance against the framework. (Alqassem, 2014)
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According to Laya, Alonso, and Alonso-Zarate (2014), the overall body of research
on M2M security is not comprehensive; in fact, it is fragmented and largely separated
into the different critical infrastructure sectors, as defined by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (Evans, Hammond, & Shamsuddin, 2014). Work has been
accomplished within these sectors, for example, on the communications and security
protocols for wireless networks, smart grids, smart home monitoring systems, and health
care systems (Laya, Alonso, & Alonso-Zarate, 2014; Joshi et al., 2014; Park, et al.,
2014).
M2M ecosystems are pervasive in nature and found across many domains (energy
sectors, manufacturing, agriculture, vehicular telematics, information management,
medical and health services, smart homes, etc.). They allow for inter-domain
communication and capillary networking for federation. Federation takes place when
M2M engages in system-to-system collaboration and interfaces together (Lee, Lee, &
Rhee, 2014). These systems and their various components interact with each other and
perform functions on behalf of humans in the virtual and physical world. As explained
by Godfrey et al. (2015), these automated functions and the potential impact of their
manipulation or disruption drive the need for new processes and the evolution of security
technology in M2M, in terms of device identity management, security capabilities for low
powered devices and security visibility tools. To this end, the literature review places a
significant focus on understanding the gaps in the literature and drawing connections
between current M2M protocols and best practices in related technologies such as
Cellular Network Devices.
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M2M Devices and Smartphone Technology
It is important to understand the differences between machine-to-human and
machine-to-machine devices because the devices have parallel security concerns. A
greater depth of research has taken place in machine-to-human technology than in
machine-to-machine technology, so it is to our benefit to understand the extent to which
machine-to-human research can be applied to security issues of M2M devices.
M2M devices use the same wireless communications networks as smartphones, but
also make use of short-range networks and gateways for peer-to-peer messaging. To this
end, the development and end-user issues that impact smartphone technology and
security also impact M2M device protocols (Gyrard, Bonnet, & Boudaoud, 2014;
Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014).
According to Zhang et al. (2011), smartphones are machine-to-human interface
devices that provide input for communication and applications function. Machine-tomachine devices, on the other hand, are small and inexpensive, and they are designed for
automated (rather than human-centered) wired or wireless communications. Both
devices rely on the same networks for communications, but M2M devices may offer
greater security concerns with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and availability due to
bandwidth restraint, authentication, access control limits, and the need for secure
identification certificates (Vandikas, et al., 2011; Kim & Hong, 2014). Nonetheless,
M2M deployed devices will outnumber smartphones within the next decade (Cruz,
Duarte, & Ferreira, 2014). In 2012, there were one billion smartphone users worldwide;
by the end of 2015, this number will reach 1.75 billion and, by the end of 2020, the
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number of connected M2M devices will potentially reach 50 billion (Cruz, Duarte, &
Ferreira, 2014).
While smartphones have specific usage and characteristics from a user behavioral
perspective (Welsh, Baird, Zhao, & Block-Schachter, 2014), M2M devices are designed
for specific tasks and industry functions (Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014). However,
according to Gyrard, Bonnet, and Boudaoud (2014), many M2M devices currently use
2G and 3G embedded modules, which lead to old and new vulnerabilities and security
challenges that require new security mechanisms for countermeasures. Given these
factors, researchers have proposed various changes to authentication in order to offer
built-in authentication and security for easier deployment and network optimization
(Hersent, Boswarthick, & Elloumi, 2012; Xu, Liu, Huang, & Zhang, 2014). However,
these changes are untested and not standardized.
Although smartphones are capable of more complex tasks than most M2M devices,
the functionality of the two types of devices is basically the same. Both are attractive
targets for attackers (Aucinas, Crowcroft, & Hui, 2012). Both types of devices can be
affected by data integrity issues and, therefore, require data protection assurance
(McGrath & Scanaill, 2013). Smartphones hold user privacy-data and M2M devices
transport this same data.
For example, smartphone global positioning system (GPS) networks are not only
tied to standalone applications, but are also increasingly tied to social media services
(Scipioni & Langheinrich, 2010). The location-based software on a consumer’s phone
may be engaged in collecting and publishing location information whether or not the
consumer is actually aware of these processes, and this data can be linked to smart city
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M2M devices as well (Scipioni & Langheinrich, 2010). GPS data can then be used to
stamp location information onto digital photographs in order to profile tourists as they
travel, which leads to a privacy violation in the examining of the user’s movements
throughout a city (Gasson, et al., 2011).
Information security best practices provide classification to the data for applying
security controls to smartphones and the wireless network elements over which the
devices function (Kazmi, Felguera, Vila, & Marcos, 2012). In the M2M ecosystem, on
the other hand, automated decisions and business logic create the rules on data transport,
which requires the implementation of higher levels of security (Pang, et al., 2013).

Specific Threats to M2M Devices Predicated by Smartphone Challenges
There is evidence that M2M devices have similar areas of vulnerability to
smartphones devices in terms of data security. As Christiansen (2011) explains, the
different forms of mobile data are collected and used by corporations in the following
three ways.
1. Collect personal data and aggregate it to sell to third parties, use it internally,
or both.
2. Collect personal data, keeping personal data within the company but
providing the opportunity for advertisers to specify a certain range of traits for
target marketing.
3. Collect personal data with the intention of selling the information, sometimes
including specific profiles or names, to third parties. (p. 509)
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Consumers may not be aware of when and the means by which this data is
collected through smartphones and M2M devices, nor of when it might be passed on to
third parties (Christiansen, 2011; King & Jessen, 2010; Leontiadis et al., 2012; Scipioni
& Langheinrich, 2010; Xu et al., 2011). This is because the majority of users do not read
the privacy and user agreements they sign when they purchase or download software
(Christiansen, 2011). But, as Kiukkonen et al. (2010) explains, consumers do not
perceive the connection between these types of information and their usage, especially in
an M2M ecosystem where there might not be a user agreement. M2M network owner’s
need to become more aware of how and why consumers choose to give them access to
their own data, and whether or not there is an actual choice taking place, especially when
many of the data mining techniques are hidden from the consumer’s view on a daily
basis. All of this data is thus likely to be open to external scrutiny if the M2M or
smartphone system is compromised.
Security researchers have identified ways to bypass device restrictions and install
rewritten firmware that creates malicious vulnerabilities within smartphones (Aviv,
Gibson, Mossop, Blaze, & Smith, 2010; Park, Choi, Eom, & Chung, 2013; Karim, Shah,
& Salleh, 2014). If these same types of attacks were to occur within the context of a
medical M2M device instead of within a smartphone environment, this could lead to the
harm or even death of a hospital patient (Pérez-Cebollada, Martínez-Ruiz, & BernalAgustín, 2014). According to Pérez-Cebollada, Martínez-Ruiz, and Bernal-Agustín
(2014), M2M devices that transport medical data are not secure because the memory of
the devices is limited. New authentication and secure communications are required to
protect the data and the device. Given these factors, both the potentially critical nature of
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the industries involved as well as the potential threats to property and human safety make
M2M security a high priority.
The smartphone air interface threat is also significant to M2M devices because
evidence has shown that smartphones and wireless platforms have been attacked by a
number of vectors that will compromise M2M devices. Examples include: the “man-inthe-middle” scenario, where an attacker can place a device between the target user and
the network (Ukil, Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013); the compromising of
authentication where an attack on the “challenge and response pairs”, the cipher keys,
overrides the integrity keys of the authentication vector (Cheng, 2011); and
eavesdropping, wherein the intruder listens to signaling and data connections associated
with users and network elements without the knowledge of users (Arapinis et al., 2012).
Also, an attacker can impersonate a user or an entire network by using false signals, user
data, or both through the network in an attempt to make the network believe they
originate from a “good” user. Furthermore, signals, user data, or both can be sent to a
target user to make that user believe they originate from a genuine network (Arapinis et
al., 2012).
Nonetheless, the greatest threat to mobile devices comes from malware embedded
in applications and the fact that these devices are always connected to a network
(Distefano et al., 2010). Mobile application development has exploded, but the capability
of sending mobile malware to devices has exploded at the same time. Malware has
infected wireless-enabled devices and is capable of propagating itself to other devices,
including M2M devices (Liu, Zhang, Yan, & Chen, 2009; Landman, 2010). The wireless
industry as a whole is ill-prepared to combat the problem. According to Felt et al.
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(2011), malware grew to epidemic proportions from 2009 to 2011. Malware programs
exploited all mobile operating systems, and their designs have reached a paramount level
of sophistication. It is unknown how quickly Malware will move in an M2M ecosystem.
Data attacks have also been on the increase. Over the past ten years, wireless
devices have become more and more data-enabled. M2M devices receive and send data,
and access applications and information quickly (Miluzzo et al., 2010). Xie et al. (2010)
examined the security services that are provided at the device level and discovered that
vendors and developers change security profiles for faster data transfer over open
networks. M2M devices lack security tokens but transfer valuable information and do
not offer proper security guidelines for open wireless networks, the lack of these
guidelines increases security and privacy concerns (Ashley, Hinton, & Vandenwauver,
2001). If infected with a virus, the stored information will be lost or even transferred to
an unauthorized user. To promote better security, a new framework approach is needed
that supports security design at the component level and that defines best practices for
next generation networks (Guo et al., 2013).
Device-to-device attacks have also become more common. Voris, Saxena, and
Halevi (2011) explained that devices are capable of functioning as both attackers and
victims of an attack. Motivations for such attacks range from simple vandalism to
information theft, mobile phone spam, and denial-of-service attacks (Goel, 2011). In this
form of malware, mobile bots function as propagation applications that cause excessive
charges to customers, deteriorate services, and even cause public relations disasters
(Nadji et al., 2011). Chan, Venkataraman, Chaugule, and Campbell (2010) proved that
attacks need not be complex and can serve to launch an authentication attack on the
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operating systems that bypasses access control mechanisms and forces a restart of the
systems. Chan et al. (2010) described an attack that used the mobile phone as the vector
and allowed for access to files and network connections. Using the M2M device as a
vector will compromise relevant public information on various platforms (Owusu, et al.,
2012). The sheer increase of the numbers of M2M devices and their wide disbursement
will present more opportunities for devices to be used as vectors. The lack of security
controls within M2M makes the ecosystem more susceptible to compromise, which could
lead to collateral damage to the M2M ecosystem. Federation among M2M systems,
including capillary networks using multiple communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee,
Bluetooth, Z-Wave and others), offers even more opportunity for compromise of
authentication, authorization, and verification.
According to Bahga and Madisetti (2014), the monitoring capabilities and
processes that providers use to detect and respond to security incidents within the M2M
ecosystem must evolve. Today’s processes and tools for detection of M2M security
events including present communication protocols, traffic patterns, and even the potential
massive distributed scale of the IoT are immature. According to El-Mahdy (2014), M2M
devices are vulnerable to the same attacks as smartphones, as well as new forms of
security threats. M2M platforms such as connected cars, sensors, and smart homes are
especially susceptible to these same attacks, in addition to denial-of-services attacks and
intrusion. For example, the flooding attack is of great concern, according to Liu, Yang,
and Liu (2014). In a flooding attack, a network interface is compromised by
misconfigured end-devices, which causes an authentication signaling failure on the
signaling and user plane of the M2M device. Another worrisome possibility is the attack
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of a botnet of malicious devices that attempt to flood the network (Jermyn, SallesLoustau, & Zonouz, 2014). Jung, Kim, and Kim, (2014) warn that the ability to generate
and disseminate detailed information on M2M networks facilitates the spread of malware.
Specifically designed malware that may infect M2M devices within a group could cause
a lack of authentication mechanisms on M2M platforms adjacent to the main device.
These platforms include connected car or smart grid gateway sensors (Li et al., 2014).
M2M devices are also subject to data modification and manipulation attacks against data
(Ren, Yu, Ma, & Ren, 2013). Modification attacks target against the integrity of routing
messages to the prioritized devices, which causes a failure in service and can lead to harm
or even death in the case of medical systems or connected cars (Jeon, Lee, Park, & Jeong,
2013). Detecting these attacks is a primary concern, especially in smart metering
networks, where source authenticity and data integrity changes can harm the power grid
(Abdullah, Welch, & Seah, 2013).
In addition, communications with and authentication of a device in an M2M
ecosystem is of utmost importance for these devices to successfully function together to
protect against legacy attacks (Ren, Yu, Ma, & Ren, 2013). To explain further, consider
an M2M device endpoint that sends messages using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP),
which falls victim to the SIP messaging attack. These attacks take advantage of known
SIP vulnerabilities and can cause channel eavesdropping attacks, credential compromise
attacks, function compromise attacks, and ghost compromise attacks (Ren et al., 2013).
SIP messaging is also vulnerable to impersonation compromise attacks (Koh & Kwon,
2014). It is possible that if a spoofed SIP message is sent to a specific M2M device, the
collected sensitive subscriber information will be compromised. Also at risk in M2M is
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theft of service itself. This occurs in a repurposing attack, where sensors in power meters
and devices within connected car fuel systems and compromise or services are used
without getting charged for them (Obikoya, 2014).
For this research, we broke down the M2M security challenges into four layers:
data collection, communications, computing, and action (Gyrard, 2013). Challenges
within each of these layers include deployment, maintenance, and measurement, as well
as the risk of failure; the complexity and number of hard-to-manage devices on M2M
projects make the latter a particular concern (Gyrard, 2013). For example, when a power
company deploys a vast number of power meter reading devices to connect to homes, the
company runs the risk of overwhelming the wireless communication networks and
thereby threatening the security and privacy of the ecosystem (Brahmi, 2014). Chen and
Ma (2014) explain that M2M standards are still under development and that existing
solutions are fragmented. Solutions are being designed from scratch, but conventional IT
design standards lack policy and trust. Furthermore, they do not address the challenges in
the M2M ecosystem (Cohen, Money, & Quick, 2014). Present application development
tools lack the proper data analytics, data security, and sensor management needed to
navigate the complexity within M2M ecosystems. Different network protocols, data
formats, incompatible devices, and multiple applications cause major security and
privacy concerns on M2M type systems (Das, Borisov, Mittal, & Caesar, 2014)
In M2M, the engineering of solutions that meet end user needs requires
modernization and incorporation of end-to-end threats (Chaugule, Xu, & Zhu, 2011).
Increasing the functionality of devices also increases the danger of attack to the
operator’s network and the end user’s privacy and freedom of use (Sohr, Mustafa, &
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Nowak, 2011). Current threat management programs fail to identify threats or provide
adequate safeguards to mobile devices (Neumann, 2009). This practice leads to risky
behaviors and weak security postures that do not serve to mitigate mobile security risks
and threats.
Security and privacy controls for mobile devices are created by mobile application
developers, network systems engineers, and security architects, whom are likely to rely
on lessons learned from decades of desktop protection policies (Chin et al., 2012).
Unfortunately, this practice does not work efficiently or effectively in a self-directing
network like M2M (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010). Requirements for secure coding and
system design are unique in the M2M security (Distefano, Grillo, Lentini, & Italiano,
2010).
Oberheide and Jahanian (2010) explain that security and privacy are not considered
at the design stage in mobility platforms. This is due to the fast pace of growth within
these platforms (Benjamins, 2014). Mobility service providers are pushing more
responsibility for security on to the users. However, if the user is the device itself, as in
M2M, this responsibility shift increases the security tensions in an already complex user
environment, which can lead to a great misunderstanding in the differences in user
behaviors and might possibly promote security risks (Emerging Cyber Threats Report
2011; 2012).
Security policy focuses on trust, information protection, and access control rules.
These policies define the requirements that enforce security policies developed by IT
departments using old rules (Chen, 2013). Chen (2013) explains that these policies do
not satisfy the challenges of and do not create suitable security policies for M2M.
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Security systems are not effective if users’ perceived security and privacy requirements
are not included at the design stage (Savola, 2009). As environmental and policy changes
take place, it becomes necessary to find a solution for detecting system behaviors and
specification changes, especially because M2M encompasses different industries with
many different types of devices and access technologies (Chen, 2013).
There is a need to look deeply into the practices that govern both the use of M2M
devices and their deployment by businesses. According to Rodríguez, Cuéllar, Lilius,
and Calvo-Flores (2014), human activity representation and daily human behaviors
studies establish the criteria for the evaluation of missing features for both security and
privacy. According to Chen (2013), typical information security practices involve
assessing processed data, assigning a data classification, and applying countermeasure
security controls to network elements. To this end, it is important to move beyond just
the data and network element when determining security controls in M2M development,
because it is unclear where these devices will be deployed (Chen, 2013; Rodríguez,
Cuéllar, Lilius, & Calvo-Flores, 2014).
Chen (2013) explains that machine-to-human interacting systems analyze incoming
attack information in a demand attack-defense fashion. This approach leads to only a
partial view of the entire attack and requires great human effort to configure and deploy
applications. In M2M, the potentially critical nature of the industries involved and the
potential threats to property and human safety make security a higher priority (Chen,
2013). When assessing the design and security controls of an M2M ecosystem, the
potential impacts of a compromise must be analyzed and understood before one engineers
the network and applications. For example, a compromise at a water treatment facility
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could result in an unsafe water supply and the loss of human life. A compromise of a
fleet management system of heavy equipment, on the other hand, may create problems
for the owner of the equipment, but most likely will not endanger human life (Bojic et al.,
2012).

Challenges Presented for Adequate Management Solutions
Mobile Device Management platforms (MDM) are the default platforms for
protecting sensitive information in the event that a smartphone is lost, stolen, or
compromised (Redman, Girard, & Wallin, 2011). These platforms can perform a remote
device wipe, enhance behind-the-firewall security, and support access and control for
thousands of users and applications (Redman et al., 2011). In addition, the devices using
these platforms are loaded with small applications, called clients that create enhanced ondevice security and security policy enforcement by over-the-air controls (Khan, Khan,
Nauman, Ali, & Alam, 2009). MDMs mitigate the privacy and security risks by
controlling smartphone security policy through the adjustment of work and private data
spaces and segregating of remote device management.
According to Ebersold (2014), the M2M ecosystem is an immature and the rapidly
changing landscape is in need of security controls. The M2M domain remains
uncontrolled, with distributed locations of devices and end nodes. Because of this, the
ecosystem is considered untrusted and lacking in security requirements; they reflect a
limited amount of control. Remote device management for M2M is unlike traditional
service models, because there are many devices talking to each other and the backend
system. These devices perform real world actions, like locking doors and changing the
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flight direction of an airplane in flight. However, the mass deployment of M2M services
is not supported efficiently by present standards. This hinders the control and
management of many device functions (Wu, et al., 2011).
Therefore, M2M devices are designed to function as self-monitoring devices.
However, the traditional management techniques do not scale up to the growth of M2M
networks and services. According to Song, Kunz, Schmidt, and Szczytowski (2014), new
MDM functionalities must be developed to manage and control M2M devices. These
functionalities include overload control, conflict management, and semantic interworking
controls. The systems themselves must learn personalized service recommendations and
policy changes (Kamal et al., 2013). Thus, in the management of traffic, adaptive radio
resource management could reduce random access delay experienced by the device (Hsu,
Wang, & Tseng, 2013). It is very challenging to manage all different types of devices for
effective communication with one another because of scalability and interoperability (that
is, what works for one platform might not work for another) (Floeck, Papageorgiou,
Schuelke, & Song, 2014). M2M devices will very soon encompass a multitude of
communication technologies and will connect to other devices and with many different
networks. These devices are unattended and difficult to monitor. Lack of overall
visibility capabilities into the M2M domain and relevant device capabilities make it
difficult to detect when a compromise has occurred. Thus, M2M requires a paradigm
shift in how security is designed (Granjal, Monteiro, and Sliva, 2013).
Chen and Chang (2012) describe the problems with M2M intrusion detection. Few
studies have investigated M2M specific intrusion detection systems (IDS). However,
related work in wireless sensor networks (WSN) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANET)
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may provide methods to identify vulnerability characteristics for M2M. Chen and Chang
(2012) explain that M2M hardware constraint is a challenge mostly because of the
unreliability of wireless links between sensor and actuator nodes within the radio
frequency spectrum in the low power radio networks. In addition, Anggorojati, Prasad,
and Prasad (2013) explain that it is difficult to identify the rational attacker from the
defender in M2M ecosystems because the devices are automated.
These known IDS techniques are not fully efficient because it is difficult to
characterize the normal behavior of a sensor and then identify the known behavior
patterns of non-authorized devices (Khan & Pathan, 2013). Hammoudeh, MancillaDavid, Selman, and Papantoni-Kazakos (2013) proposed a specification-based IDS to
solve this problem. The specification-based IDS is a combination solution that detects
malicious message transmissions. A Timing Centric IDS that identifies changes in
timing and device response might also pose a solution (Kumar & Chilamkurti, 2014).
In order to achieve the goal of this work, we experimented with specification-based
intrusion detection to challenge and prove that the new security framework worked
functionally and correctly. As security policies changed, data was collected and analyzed
to verify that security had increased. This testing focused on the added value of the
security framework, by observing when a set of resources changed and how different
security values affected the security policy (Anggorojati, Prasad, & Prasad, 2013).

Assessment of the Gaps in the Literature and Business Applications
The findings from this literature review indicate that there is a lack of and need for
a method for assessing the overall ecosystem security and identifying applicable security
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controls for M2M devices. Typical security practices involve assessing the sensitivity of
data that is being processed, assigning a classification to the data, and applying
appropriate security controls based on the data sensitivity (the more sensitive the data, the
more stringent the controls). The use of inexpensive sensors, mobile and wireless
communications, short-range networks, and gateways as enablers to M2M systems
present unique security challenges.
It is evident that devices will be pervasive throughout an M2M ecosystem and will
be performing automated functions on behalf of humans as the field of M2M technology
develops. If the function is manipulated or fails, the potential impacts could be wide
ranging, depending upon the criticality of the function. The capability to deploy security
control on lower power devices, the lack of visibility, and the processes of device
management are some of the evident challenges (Fischer, 2014).
The literature demonstrates that data classification alone is insufficient to drive
security controls and a secure design for M2M. This is because the data by itself does not
address the overall role of a device in an end-to-end M2M function. For example, if one
takes temperature data measurements singly, the information is non-critical in nature.
However, the role of the temperature sensor in the context of an overall M2M function
(such as temperature regulation in a home or business) determines the importance of its
measured data. If the temperature sensor fails to operate as intended (through
manipulation or other means) in a home environment, consequences will be much
different than if the same temperature sensor fails to operate as intended in a nuclear
power plant. Intended functions, device roles, environments, and potential impacts are
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therefore key aspects of deriving M2M functional classification in a way that drives a
secure design (Godfrey et al., 2015).
Past research demonstrated the need to devise a new M2M security framework that
is practical for use in each of the 16 national critical infrastructure sectors (Rubin, Lynch,
Escaravage, & Lerner, 2014). A framework that could compare, contrast, and make
quantifiable statements about security is an extremely valuable security asset for all
systems (Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner, 2012). Such a framework allows organizations to
determine where resources, policies, and procedures should be placed to best secure
present and future systems.
The developed framework was tested against present security frameworks to justify
the rationale for how well the new framework reaches security goals for M2M. Building
a prototype helped obtain a more complete and thorough understanding of the system and
framework. However, it was difficult to compare real world systems with lab-based
systems because there is a lack of understanding of what security really means in the
M2M ecosystem and when the properties of this system are truly secure. So also offered
is a new testing approach for security in M2M that overcomes this problem in order to
gain knowledge from the development process as defined by Alqassem, (2014).

Summary
The Machine-to-Machine ecosystem is quickly becoming a commercial offering of
devices, networks and platforms. The devices are tiny, unsecure components that are
hard to command and control. The ecosystem communicates over wireless, wire line,
private and public networks. M2M platforms are presently being developed for all things
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that connect to the Internet. This systems development effort leads to and allows the
objects such as device and gateways to function unnoticed by humans and thereby
expand end-user concerns about the balances between security and privacy of services,
safety and over systems awareness.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of the Research
This research used the systems development research methodology. This
methodology has been a applied to systems research for over the past 100 years and
draws from foundation research classification schemes, including engineering,
developmental, and formative types of research (Nunamaker & Chen, 1990). The
methodology combines processes, methods, and tools to conduct an investigative study.
The investigation leads to results that contribute to the overall body of knowledge in
applied systems development and new approaches to processes and products in the
Information Systems domain. At the research methods foundation, the systems
development methodology is ideal for investigating, improving and creating new things
(Nunamaker & Chen, 1990). This research follows the proven repeatable method of 1)
building a test system; 2) observing the behavior of the system; 3) testing the system with
tools; 4) using the results to develop a new and better system (Hubbard, 2014). In the
case of this study the outlined method was used to research the present day Security
Frameworks for mobile systems security and utilize executed testing results to create a
better Security Framework that solved the stated problem for Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) devices.
Researchers have called for further study of security and privacy in M2M
ecosystems, particularly in terms of how the requirements differ from those in present
mobile systems such as Smartphone and messaging platforms (Accorsi, Stocker, &
Müller, 2013; Alqassem, 2014; Chen, 2013; Chin, 2013). Typical security practices
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involve assessing the data that is being processed, assigning a classification to the data,
and applying appropriate security controls to network elements that handle the data.
Studying frameworks and system architectures in this way fleshes out a better policy and
improve effectiveness for protecting M2M devices.

Develop Advanced Theory
Chin et al. (2013) accomplished their smartphone research by conducting
interviews of users’ willingness to use a device for various tasks in order to test the
hypothesis that people fear their privacy and security are at risk when smartphones are
used and do not trust smartphone applications. This method will not work in M2M, as
the end points are devices and not people.
This research hypothesized that the M2M ecosystem is even less understood and
trusted by users because users are not aware of the advanced risks (Chen, 2013). A
proper study and requirements analysis method are vital for the development of all
complex systems; without them, major problems are introduced in the complete system
life cycle (Zafar, Arnautovic, Diabat, & Svetinovic, 2014). A better security framework
for M2M must offer and provide a trustworthy environment that builds the confidence of
technology recipients and enforces security implementation at the design stage (Saeed,
Tahir, Mughal, & Khan, 2014).

Research Methods
For M2M security, architects rely on use case development for framework
validation, which has created a present framework that is only theoretical (Katt, Gander,
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Breu, & Felderer, 2013). This research observed and evaluated device changes,
characteristics, and categories such as inputs, efficiency, effectiveness, outputs, quality,
impact, and the usefulness of safeguards in order to develop a functional M2M security
framework that includes and considers the capability if the devices, as supported by
Alqassem (2014). Leading to the understanding of the M2M development challenges and
supporting evidence that there is a need for an overall IoT security design and testing
method. System prototyping was applied and practical applications used to gain
knowledge as to how devices are presently protected and communicate with each other
(Parkin, Moorsel, & Coles, 2009; Alqassem, 2014). The table below shows the found
differences and similarities between present smartphones and M2M devices. These
differences are why M2M devices must be secured using a new security framework.
However, the similarities provide a foundation for testing and new methods development.
The OWASP Mobile Security and OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Project
Methods (OWASP, 2014) offer a standardized and disseminated mobile, system
applications and hardware risk model based on surveyed results. Fortify (2014) reports
that there are many techniques for testing individual platforms; however, these do not
address the general M2M threat model. The Fortify (2014) report used mobile device
testing tools to examine and compare vulnerabilities found on smartphones and matches
them to M2M devices vulnerabilities as depicted in Table 1, the below table outlines the
comparison results of present smartphone devices and future M2M devices.
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Table 1. Device Comparisons
Smartphones

M2M Devices

Yes

No

Strain on network
resources

No, mobile networks are
engineered to balance these
devices.

Yes, the number of devices
and yet unknown uses is a
contributor.

Support for legacy
networks

Somewhat—carriers are
seeking to “sunset” the 2G
network.

Yes, these devices are
engineered for mostly 2G
and 3G networks only.

Easy hardware and
software upgrade

Yes, full over-the-air support
for device management.

No, unknown ways for
firmware and SIM updates
to no SIM devices.

Yes

No

M2M Device Risks:
Direct attacks

Yes

Yes

Indirect attacks

Yes

Yes

Infrastructure and data
theft
3rd party attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Protocol attacks

Yes

Yes

No, not from a device user
side.

Yes, these devices talk to
each other.

Not on a grand scale.

Yes, due to the federation
of new platforms.

Yes

Yes

M2M Device Limits:
Always mobile

Full command, control,
and conflict management

M2M Device Attack Vectors:
Server side attacks
Infrastructure attacks
RF side interception and
eavesdropping
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Table 1. Device Comparisons continued
Open gateway attacks

No, mostly closed platforms.

Yes, undeveloped
standards and open
systems.

Low power device side
attacks

No

Yes

Yes, hackers have remotely
powered on and off devices.

Yes, attackers can take
control of home networks,
thermostats, or other
connected devices via
unprotected devices.

Encryption

No, strong encryption and
authentication on end-toend systems.

Yes, weak network
protection and
unencrypted data storage.

Password

No, most devices use signing
key and password for
firmware updates.

Yes, devices do not
validate Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) certificates.

No, standards are defined.

Yes, weak standards that
are still in development.

No, mature and proven
protocols.

Yes, protocol flaws and
untested vulnerabilities.

M2M Device Vulnerabilities:
Device control

API vulnerabilities
Vulnerable protocol

Note. Table built from Hersent, O., Boswarthick, D., & Elloumi, O. (2014) M2M
communications: A systems approach. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley Publishing.

In this research we developed a new approach that addresses the specific threats
to M2M devices by studying how the device might function when tested against proven
and successful attack scenarios. The results were then used to build the tested and new
functional security design framework for M2M devices that is presented in Chapter 5.
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Instrument Development and Validation
The test environment resembled a real world M2M network and included all
conditions, circumstances, and influences surrounding and affecting M2M devices. The
most important requirement for this test environment was the ability to systematically
collect data (Bhunia & Mukherjee, 2014). To ensure efficient data collection, this
research use a combination of systems including a commercially available development
M2M Control Center to implement visibility into the devices and devices side log files.
The control center connects to M2M devices using the wireless network and enables
devices management for analysis, diagnostics, connection history, and changes in
configuration, and the log files report all actions and anomalies on the devices.

Figure 1. Sample Testbed
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The test bed shown in Figure 1, above, is made of GSM-based modules connected
over the wireless network to the control center. The Control Center provides device
activation tools and allowed provisioning and upgrades to be performed for the device
policy for testing and study. This allowed for usage analytics when security policies
were changed and product performance, when functions were increased.

Examined Devices
We used three prototype built M2M devices for testing, validation, monitoring,
and control provisioning. The devices were built to meet the needs of the Business Logic
requirements as defined by the use case examples.

Detailed Procedure
The key to a reliable framework is the understanding and application of the
system’s rules. According to Yahya, Kamalrudin, Sidek, and Grundy (2014), one must
apply detailed use case analysis to reach this understanding, or else the framework fails.
For this research, the three below theoretical model example use cases were applied for
analysis.
Use Case 1
Request a device that allows a utility company to better manage remote devices
without human interaction.
Business Logic. Business logic comprises the rules within the M2M application
that define actions. A sensor-controlled meter with real-time feedback and control of grid
management devices is in place for Use Case 1. Tasks such as health and status checks

45
can be remotely performed and firmware updating takes place without hands-on access,
which results in lower operational costs. In addition, these devices more effectively
distribute power by directing the power where it is needed and when, which results in the
most efficient use of current assets and lower operational costs. It also decreases outages
caused by over-current conditions. Such devices help the utility company to more
accurately predict load periods.
Potential Impact. Potential impact observes what occurs if the function is
manipulated. In this case, the impact is the loss of operations’ controls and updates to the
device and severing system.
Device Data. Device Data comprises inputs and outputs to Business Logic. The
main data is messaging, in this case. Regulatory takes precedent based on the example
Use Case. Data transmission, control features, network wide changes, and updates are
vulnerable if attacked.
Supporting Components. Key elements include the sensor-controlled meter,
switch, network, and backend.
Use Case 2
Explains a smart device that utility companies will offer to customers so that they
can use smartphones, IVR, or web applications to self-service payments for electricity
services.
Business Logic. A Smart Grid prepaid electricity device provides location
specific data. Prepaid electricity is a fully managed, hosted payment solution that
interfaces with smart meters. These devices have a “disconnect service” switch for realtime payment processing.
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Potential Impact. Inaccurate or manipulated data might be sent to the backend
services. An incorrect disconnect may occur.
Device Data. Data includes meter data, messages from the meter to the backend,
backend on-off commands, and commands to meter notifying to send data.
Supporting Components. Components include the meter, capillary-network, GPS,
and backend system.
Use Case 3
This device enables the utility to remotely monitor the premise, the work
environment, and the health of specific systems.
Business Logic. A Smart Grid Cellular Communication Device with video and
location transport strictly designed and developed for Smart Grid backup security. It
allows a restart, disconnect functionality, and power shut-off at the premise, which results
in a safer operational environment.
Potential Impact. There is the risk of death or harm if the wrong system is shut
down or the device fails to report the danger.
Device Data. Data includes automated shut-off messaging, reporting of location
data, and picture data.
Supporting Components. Supporting components include the meter, network,
GPS, camera, and backend system.

Data Analysis
Most frameworks are built theoretically and conceptually. Theories predict
relationships, events, and behaviors. A theoretical framework is an inductive process.
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To prove that a framework adds value, theoretical predictions must be observed and
evaluated (Liu, et al., 2014). For this research, we observed and evaluated the critical
interrelationships among concepts. The following test performances were observed and
evaluated.


The strength of the end-to-end security attributes within the framework.



The ways the security attributes interact with each basic component.



The availability to break down each component into functional units and
scaled attributes.



How the defined units affect each security attribute.



Identification of model components associated with each attribute.



Comparison and contrast the frameworks for security and the overall value
they offer.

According to Alberts, Allen, and Stoddard (2012), some foundational work for
security frameworks development has been performed, but has yet to materialize. As a
result, decision makers and users lack confidence in the security of emerging systems that
have been developed (Buyens, Scandariato, & Joosen, 2009).
According to Flood and Keane (2014), data analysis and systems design
encompasses a beginning three-step process: information gathering, static analysis, and
dynamic analysis. For this research, the following method was used to extract
information out of the use cases, as listed below.
(1) Information Gathering:


Do the running applications provide security protections? Example:
Does the device allow SMS messaging?
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Are the networking interfaces protected? Example: Is there mobile
communication only or Wi-Fi wireless, too?



Are various networks supported? Example: Various networks include
2G, LTE, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth.



Do the networking protocols meet industry standards? Example: Are
secure protocols used, such as M2M/IoT (XMPP, MQTT)?



Are transactions performed that require additional security protections?
Example: Do transactions include payment information, personal data,
or location data?



Are hardware components exposed? Example: GPS or Camera might
be exposed.

(2) Static Analysis:


Perform a detailed analysis of the device source code based on the
Business Logic requirement.



Review the Operating System security framework.



Verify that all applications cannot be extracted.



Outline the permissions for authorized access.



Analyze configuration files and verify access controls.



Analyze all points where untrusted data entry may be inputted.



Outline the user authentication process.



Identify the functionality of inbound connections from other devices.



Perform privilege elevation analysis.



Test and analyze the encryption that is used on the device.
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Seek out device and platform exposed APIs.

(3) Dynamic Analysis:


Depending on the device vs. Use Case, discover the vulnerability of all
Native Mobile Applications running on the device.



Analyze the Web services in use from the device to the end server.



Verify the authentication process from the device to serving gateways.



Determine the access controls for gateways and aggregator devices.



Analyze the message delivery round-trip time for the M2M device.



Analyze the results of data manipulation generated by outside sources.

Targets
We identified the following device targets based on the data analysis from the
example use cases.
1. Web Applications: Use Cases 1, 2, and 3 are all web interfacing scenarios
with numerous opportunities for attackers to inject malicious code. These
devices run the risk of becoming weaponized attack tools that can be used for
SQL injection or to expose cross-site scripting flaws. These attacks can cause
Denial of Service (DoS), XSS and HTML Injection errors, and attacks against
web-facing applications. They can compromise sensitive information that is
stored on devices (de Ipiña et al., 2005).
2. Authentication: Authentication of a device is of utmost importance within any
system. However, traditional authentication schemes always assume that a
person is present. M2M devices’ access methods are sometimes limited.
Specific security requirements that are based on Use Case demand must meet
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the unique needs of the framework and formally model the authentication for
the ecosystems (Cha, et al., 2009).
3. Authorization and Insufficient Transport Layer Protection: Use Case examples
2 and 3 call for sensitive data transport. The M2M devices store local data and
configuration files with limited resources. Protection of the user’s privileges
and discovery of bypass methods is required if the device is going to security
transmit and store sensitive data; this includes the access to transport
messaging and location data (Kothmayr, et al., 2013).
4. Unintended Data Leakage during Session Management: The devices and
network management session must try to avoid aggressive transport of short
sessions or transport of very long sessions of data to avoid data leakage. The
processing power behavior of small devices must reduce signaling and power
overhead to protect sensitive information. This includes logging and
transition data, overhead messages between other components and devices,
and sensitive user data. These devices are low powered and resource limited
in processing, so they require smaller encryption keys than other devices like
Smartphones, to protect against attack (Song, Kunz, Schmidt, & Szczytowski,
2014).
5. Cryptography: M2M devices are vulnerable to brute force attacks. If, in any
of the Use Cases, such an attack is successful, the ecosystem as a whole is
placed in danger. These attacks expose applications and data information to
the possible reconstruction of encrypted messages and exposure of weak
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protocols in a Life/Safety function, which could cause harm or death (Gyrard,
Bonnet, & Boudaoud, 2014).
6. Untrusted Inputs and Binary Protections: M2M devices have limited file and
data storage capabilities in the cache and drive space. It is imperative for
security that no unprotected data is left on the devices and that unencrypted
data storage is controlled, because this is where other weaknesses can be
exploited (Dye & Scarfone, 2014).
Exact Tests
The exact tests have been outlined in the tables as shown in the Appendix A.
section. Described are the tests that were executed to verify device compliance and
function capability as required by the defined use cases, the results then were used to
build a “Functional Security Design Framework for M2M Devices”.
When the results were shown to be different from expected it proved that the
typical security practices require additional assessment and development leading to future
research opportunity. This outcome also proved that the devices do not meet the
correctly assigned capability required as per the use cases, because the corresponding
security controls were not identified during testing. For a functional framework to be
“functional,” the strength of the controls employed must be equivalent to the sensitivity
level of the data. If the device classification is “only” protected, this means that
insufficient security has been applied. The device and the data transported by the device
will not address the overall role of a device in an M2M ecosystem. The business logic
and the potential impact sections of the use cases should lead to the security of the device
and the capabilities will drive the development of the functional M2M security
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framework. We used these sections to gain the knowledge to determine security controls,
formulate better requirements and drive security architecture at the design stage of the
device.
When the devices did not meet the requested function, then requirements were
added or device components changed until the logic, data type, and potential impact
balanced the risk. Simply discovering vulnerabilities does not estimate the associated
risk to the business, user, or ecosystem. The Repeatable Method approach was used to
allow for the evolutionary process to take place and for the discovery of new
countermeasures against potential risks to the business, device, and user of the ecosystem
to be realized.
A Repeatable Method approach is required because vulnerabilities that are critical
to one use case may not be very important to another use case. We declare that
functional frameworks should allow customized changes and retesting for each particular
use case. This flexibility helps to develop solid security requirements that satisfy the
overall roles and classifications of a device placed within any particular end-to-end M2M
function.

Format for Presenting Results
In order to create a framework methodology, the following outline was used as a
guide:
1. Define specific functions and operations within M2M services.


A remote device control, for example, provides automated environment
controls based on business-driven requirements.
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2. Look at the properties of the various functions and operations within the
service.


Does the function involve any of the following data?
i. Non-sensitive information like error reporting
ii. Personal private information like legal/ or regulatory statutes or
protected data
iii. Personal confidential, like identifying number addresses or assets
iv. Payment/financial information
v. Critical harm or financial loss
vi. Life and death or could cause harm

3. Identify and classify the functions in the M2M system.
In the case of M2M, it is important to move beyond the data and network
elements when determining security controls. Elements in the M2M ecosystem may
make automated decisions and take actions based not only on data, but also on associated
business logic (Aslam, Gehrmann, & Björkman, 2013). These actions may be referred to
as functions that the device is capable of performing. Within some scenarios, the same
devices support functions of varying importance. Therefore, a method was needed to
determine security controls for M2M that would classify the overall functions and apply
proper security controls based on that functional security need as balanced by the
device’s functional capabilities. An M2M ecosystem will have multiple functions and
needs. Each function must be identified and classified to ensure that correct security
controls are identified, that security recommendations are made, and that trust exists
(Aslam, Gehrmann, & Björkman, 2013).
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This research aimed towards a new and better security framework for the devices
that depended on real-world device use cases, design-centric data collection, investigation
of device changes, and device behaviors when security controls are applied to the M2M
ecosystem (Accorsi, Stocker, & Müller, 2013). Studying the foundation framework
helped organize ideas and led to the development of a better framework based on
efficient device tasks.

Validate Methodology by Executing Within an Actual Production Project
In order to develop a new framework, the following inputs from the theoretical
functional classification framework were used:


Business logic (rules within the M2M application that define actions)



Device data (inputs and outputs to business logic)



Potential impact (consequence if the function is manipulated)

These three inputs determine the overall functional classification of the Use Case,
which will helped to ensure that security and privacy within requirements can be applied
once the functional classification exercise has been completed (Abie & Balasingham,
2012; Godfrey et al., 2015).
M2M devices must be designed to perform a particular function. These functions
can be classified into categories ranging from “non-impacting” to “life-threatening”
(Godfrey et al., 2015). The final framework takes into consideration that the security
controls applied to a particular device must be equal to the applied “classification” of the
device. Devices and the components inside these devices often lack fundamental security
controls, such as secure boot, authentication and authorization, secure update capabilities,
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and encrypted communications. Framework rules created with application and device
control-based functional classifications described lead to the development and
enforcement of new industry standards and security policies (Alqassem, 2014).

Resource Requirements
Three M2M connection kits featuring the GSM/Wi-Fi modules were used to meet
this study’s goals. Also a M2M test bed for the development and experimental
assessment of the framework’s security controls was built for the prototype devices.
These devices are GSM/GPRS/EDGE devices that are running Unix operating systems
and use the Web based API control application for management from a desktop. These
kits cost $999 each at the time of this research. All software used was shareware or open
source. The M2M Control Center is provided free of charge as part of an innovation
developer program. The program offers a set of developer tools and real-time visibility
into the device and network behaviors. Also, built for this research was a prototype Wi-Fi
test bed system for device scanning and testing and a prototype 2G Cellular network test
bed using OpenBTS and USRP radios to simulated the cellular network for security and
performance testing.

Summary
Security Frameworks are a set of tools that can be used to develop requirements
for devices and systems. These frameworks can also be used to test new business
models, seek problem solutions, and forecast functionality. This chapter outlines efforts
that had been taken to refine the initial framework into a novel framework by testing new

56
models and developing new solutions to offer a new security framework for M2M
devices.
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Chapter 4
Results

Introduction
This research focused on the development of a new framework for securing M2M
type devices by applying the System Development Methodology. The goal of the
analysis phase was to improve the knowledge of present processes, services, and
functions. Researchers are concerned with present technology and how this technology
may improve and be made more secure (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2015). As described by
Vaishnav and Kuechler (2015, p 285) new frameworks may be developed using a ModelDriven Approach and drawn out of logical models that are developed from data collected
during the prototype testing and analysis phase of the greater method.
The testing approach included both “requirements verification–based testing” and
“attack based testing”. The testing followed a pattern-based methodology leading to a
step-by-step procedure for repeatable evaluation of M2M type devices. This method
provided a baseline for future testing by finding vulnerabilities on “function” oriented
devices. The baseline was formed around the air interface on both Wi-Fi and Cellular
Wireless vulnerabilities. Industry standard techniques that have revealed results when
applied to similar devices such as smart-phones, Wi-Fi based devices and embedded
device type systems were applied (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic, & Palaniswami, 2013). As
explained in Chapter 3, Table 2, the OWASP Security Projects theorizes ten risks to
various ecosystems. Determined was that the hypothesis that “vulnerabilities are
transferred to next technologies” is true when applying the described testing methods.
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System and Testing Analysis
The requirements determination phase of the Systems Development Methodology
for systems analysis is “prototyping”. As explained by Dehghani and Ramsin, (2015)
prototypes take on many forms and systems; process and models can be prototyped. The
Prototype Methodology is a technique and supplemental methodology of the Systems
Development Methodology. Holmlid and Evenson (2007) explain that prototypes
explore future reality by distinguishing and comparing exploration and demonstration.
To design the final framework we distinguished and compared prototyped physical
testing results with prior literature review results. The modeled theorized security
framework is taken under analysis by executing both functional and evolutionary
prototyping categorizations for output evaluation (Dehghani & Ramsin, 2015). The
functional test verifies actual system functions by using real and known attack scenarios.
Once expected and actual results were verified and known, the evolutionary approach
was then applied, producing reliable requirements for the better framework and final
operational system. The operational system is built from the knowledge gained during the
prototype testing which also led to a better understanding of the requirements required to
secure M2M devices.

Findings
This research focused on the device hardware, simple task oriented applications
and data transport means. Test (1) was the execution of full vulnerably scan to identify
obvious attack points (Hager, 2013). This approach focuses on identifying running
services of the device such as operating systems and open ports. Once known, next steps
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to follow are realized and executed. All test were run within private wireless networks
consisting of various devices including two smartphones and three prototyped M2M-type
devices.

Weak Server Side Controls
Expected and Actual Results
Results proved that there were vulnerabilities on all devices. Baseline
vulnerability scanning was applied and directed towards analyzing “Weak Server Side
Controls”. This threat usually includes an untrustworthy input to a backend API service,
web service, or traditional web server application. When reversed, the process and focus
is from the attack direction, originating from server towards the M2M-type device
interface. It was found that if an adversary sends malicious inputs or unexpected
sequences to a device from a server the devices becomes a vulnerable endpoint and reveal
attack vector.
Server-side control attacks are an important security threat when pointed towards
the device. Findings proved that when a user acts like a serving system and performs
vulnerability scanning this identifies open ports on the devices. Also found during the
scan was the assigned IP addresses, the device’s operating system, software, and services
that are running on the device. The additional finding showed that when devices are
vulnerable to applications and have open communication ports they are exposed to
attacks such as DoS, malware infestation and Cross-Site Scripting attacks. Scanning for
known vulnerabilities allows for the discovery of access opportunities. Also, discovered
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was that these test will impact the device communication protocols within the servicelayer and the storage of encryption keys for authentication.
Improved requirement
Critical M2M devices should be protected against port scanners by hiding or
closing all unused TCP and UDP ports. Implementing Internet Protocol (IP) filtering and
other firewall techniques on a device level will close any open connections to active
sockets and protect the device from discovery. Also, device applications must ensure that
only required ports allow incoming connections and devices required to send content are
patched with the latest security updates.

Insecure Data Storage
Testing found that configuration settings impact data storage and expose
vulnerabilities to the privacy and security of the messaging data. This is important
because, host discovery, port scanning, operation system detection, and service discovery
all expose the running applications and stored data located on the device, which can be
used to launch other attacks.
Expected and Actual results:
It was expected that the results would show that the standard behavior for each of
the events is capable of being identified on each device because there are no additional
transport protections implemented. As expected, the actual result proved that various
TCP and UDP ports are opened on the M2M devices as well as the other network
connected devices. Knowledge gained from this test was that the devices are prototyped
and the ports can be turned off or on. However, for the device to communicate
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seamlessly, applications such as SMS messaging must remain opened. This case showed
the device to be vulnerable to various known SMS attacks.
However, being able to scan a device is not a bad thing. Discovering
vulnerabilities or configuration errors results in understanding where intrusions can occur
and leads to the development of better countermeasures.
Improved requirement
M2M devices that allow for systematic scanning and allow review of process
running should be controlled in a known manner by a central gateway or system. Other
devices require secure countermeasures against random port scanning. Devices need a
method for quarantining the applications and revoking the permissions after the
applications are closed. This method will prevent exposed ports, allowing only ports that
are required for data transfer to be exposed. In addition, for devices that communicate
over the cellular network, updating the device communications module to 3G and placing
a 3G or above smart card into the device for authentication and authorization would
increase security and strengthens server side controls protections.

Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
Findings proved that insufficient transport layer protections lead to improper
session handling. Service-layer keys and the storage of keys on the device is a known
device vulnerability as described (oneM2M Partners, 2013). The service layer consists of
all the services that the manufacturer makes available on the devices or that is
preinstalled by device peripherals. The long-term service-layer consists of keys that may
be discovered while they are stored on the devices. If discovered, these keys may be
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copied and used against the device or gateway during other attacks (Ukil,
Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013). The services layer is highly vulnerable to
attack because the data within the layer provides the business functionality that allows the
devices’ supported communications and messaging to and from the gateway. If copied,
the long-term service-layer keys may be used to impersonate M2M devices to the
gateways or vice versa (Latvakoski et al., 2009). When long-term service-layer keys are
stored within the M2M device or M2M gateways, they may be discovered during
scanning by unauthorized entities (Minoli, 2015). For example, Transport Layer Security
(TLS) uses a cryptographic system with two keys to encrypt data (Hersent, Boswarthick,
& Elloumi, 2011). Once the keys are discovered, they can be used for illegitimate
purposes, such as false authorization and authentication. There are various methods for
discovering open and available keys. Hardware probing methods include the monitoring
of internal processes or simply the reading of memory contents. According to Lu,
O’Neill, and McCanny (2010), DPA is a widely studied side-channel attack however this
attack is outside the scope of this research.
Improved Requirement
It is recommended that Random Delay Insertion (RDI) be deployed as a
countermeasure technique. However, M2M devices run weak cryptographic processes
and do not have the resources for increased countermeasures that will reduce the risk of
DPA attacks.
Expected and Actual results
Findings showed that devices are impacted by the device communication
protocols within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for authentication.
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Also found was that wireless networks and configuration settings are impacted by these
found vulnerabilities because the privacy and security of messaging is again at risk.
There is no indication that these devices are protected and analysis proved that ports that
are open and running on the device which can be exposed, leading to authorization and
access to the device by rogue application execution.
We expected to find security vulnerabilities against the open ports and testing
proved that there are inherent limitations to resources on these devices. Actual results
also showed that data is stored read-only with limited in storage time as required by
standard policy. However, the devices tested are prototyped devices and unsecure. So, as
expected when testing Layer 2 with port pinging and scanning, open ports and device
information, including the TCP IP Address and MAC address was exposed. Testing also
exposed that with low processing devices, repeated testing, freezes the devices and takes
them off the network. In particular, an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request, does
determine that the host is alive and provides the MAC address of the devices in the return
message. When pinging the device (ICMP echo request) on all open ports using tools for
flooding messages, the device fails because the flood message stresses the CPU to MAX
usage.
Improved Requirement
A better design for production M2M devices would be to limit or completely shut
off of all “Ping” operation and stop Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo
request packets from targeting the device and that all IPv6 security measure be used on
M2M devices.
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Network Layer Protection
Management and control frames are directly related to service-layer keys and
focused on the Layer 3 frames because M2M data is serviced by three present
requirements: massive data analysis, real-time data analysis, and deep data analysis
(Kitagami, Yamamoto, Koizumi, & Suganuma, 2013). Information stored in the devices
can be detected and used by an attacker to compromise these systems. The device is also
at risk of being spoofed or turned into an attacking device or for attaching to a fake
access point or a fake base station. Management and control frames must be protected to
protect the protocol stack (Lin, 2008). Unprotected protocol stacks may lead to denial of
service (DoS), Man-in-the-middle (MinM), and similar attacks. This vulnerability can
prevent the operation of the overall M2M service.
Expected and Actual results
Test directed towards Network Layer Protection and Insecure Data Storage found
that M2M devices are vulnerable to stored management and control frames discovery on
Layer 2 as described by Hersent, Boswarthick, and Elloumi (2011). When testing the
possibility of locating service-layer keys within the protocol stack and the device, it was
found, that these keys could be reused, deleted, or changed. The M2M device tested use
AT COMMANDS as input and out messages. These commands are transferred over the
service-layer and a compromise will return information that impacts the constraints on
the device. The discovery of authentication frames and open data transfer may be used
for Layer 3 attacks such as DoS and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The analysis found that
there are weaknesses in the various protocols. These are known vulnerabilities in the
GSM stack. As expected, sending different configuration messages to the device on each
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port exposed the GSM vulnerabilities. Running successful scans against layer 3 and layer
4 discovered that the host is alive. However, the open and closed TCP ports did fail to
return an “Acknowledgment” to messaging and did lock the test devices when a
particular port was addressed in the execution string.
Improved Requirement
When deploying M2M device communications, each device and gateway should
be isolated over a shared network infrastructure. This network should provide
management and provisioning using a tunnel type protocol for secure data transfer and
access authentication.

Unintended Data Leakage due to Improper Session Handling
The M2M devices’ Open Standards are untested because of lacking transparency
and undefined guidelines; the use of open standards makes the device vulnerable to
attackers (Torbensen, 2011). Because these devices are usually built from commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, attackers can seek knowledge to expose
open vulnerabilities (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). Many M2M devices run a
small version of Linux as an operating system. Components such as cameras and Wi-Fi
nodes are run and accessed through files that are usually located in the file systems of the
operating system (OS) and these files communicate directly with the kernel driver that
communicates with the component hardware; leaving them vulnerable to data leakage
attack (Yaoming, 2010).
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Expected and Actual results
Unintended data leakage and improper session handling testing indicates that
sessions can be easily exposed and, once found, can lead to vulnerability. As
environmental conditions change, the RF signal, in or out data, and messaging should all
continue to match a specified value as described by the standards. Actual results showed
that vulnerabilities are successfully found over Wi-Fi and GPRS, proving that needed
information to ensure a successful penetration attack is available and device compromise
probable. The knowledge gained was that when using a threat assessment tool the
complexity and severity of a single point of failure on the device is identified by open IP
addresses, active machine names and opened various port identification points; protocol
vulnerabilities. This information leads to the discovery of running services on specific
ports for exposure by untrusted inputs. The interfaces are then exposed to attack and
directed by security decisions, untrusted inputs, and insecure data storage vulnerabilities.
The discovery proves that the devices lack human user interface and tampering resistance
notification as described by Hagar (2013).
Improved Requirement
All components must communicate transparently, regardless of their hardware
and software (Bernardi, Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013). This is important because the
critical infrastructure includes the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
networks such as the natural disaster early warning systems, crime prevention cameras,
and a range of vulnerabilities from equipment failures to terrorist attacks that threatens
the ecosystems (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006).
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Protocol tampering and device repurposing
M2M systems are designed to function without human interaction. However,
M2M message traffic, data transfer, and content are influenced by human-based traffic,
such as location data, billing data, and personalized content. The M2M device must also
be monitored, repaired, and managed by humans (Cha, et al., 2009).
Expected and Actual results
It is found that ability to detect tampering and design flaws in the device is not
possible because there is a lack of monitoring systems that allows for remote device-user
interaction.
Improved Requirement
M2M devices may be targets of physical tampering, repurposing, or modification
and require that failure indicators, such as on/off settings, hardware status, and network
control or alarms that transport over alternative networks be in place. These fail
indicators will allow an operator to take action on alarms and protect against an attacker
performing remote hacking on management or maintenance interfaces or using the device
as an attack tool.

Unrestricted File Upload/Download
Findings exposed that testing directed towards unrestricted file
“upload/download” reveals the possibility of an unrestricted file upload to the M2M
infrastructure from the device (Flick & Morehouse, 2010; Skianis, 2013). The
vulnerability affects databases, operating systems, and applications that are developed for
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internal use and the end severing systems. In the case of M2M ecosystems that are
connected to the Internet with unrestricted access, these platforms lack restrictions on the
size or number of uploaded files that are sent to and from devices. Files that are too large
will consume resources and freeze the device operations (Flick & Morehouse, 2010).
When open access to SSH or FTP servers is found the device data storage is at risk. If an
attacker uploads or transfers files of dangerous types using an automated processed
within the M2M ecosystem, for example, via open FTP ports, the ecosystem does not
block the “input file” and actual result show this to be true, making it possible for the
device to be weaponized.
Expected and Actual results
As expected there was the discovery of UDP ports and these ports are open and
actual results prove that these ports remain open after message transfer. However, the
tools identified that open ports are only open until closed by the communication software.
It was observed that it is very easy to identify hosts using discovery against UDP and
probing an isolated task and that the ICMP host are unreachable when requesting
“responses” to identify live hosts with UDP requests on closed ports was discovered as
expected. Additional scanning reported that all open ports for discovery allow for
fingerprinting of services. Testing discovered, for example, that port 22 (SSH) is opened
on the device but the other ports are closed. SSH is opened at install of the OS and not
closed at reboot leaving an open door opportunity for device compromise.
Improved requirement
M2M devices must protect against the discovery of sensitive data. The protection
of sensitive data in M2M devices and M2M gateways leads to protection against broken
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cryptography and lack of binary protections (Pandey, Choi, Kim, & Hong). M2M
devices, such as sensors, collect data that is sensitive, including toxic levels of poison, the
temperature of machinery, and personal consumer data. The execution of sensitive
functions and the storage and transfer of this information must be protected.

Broken Cryptography and Lack of Binary Protections
According to Pandey, Choi, Kim, and Hong (2011), the M2M ecosystem has
important characteristics that other ecosystems do not, like, sleeping devices, low power
devices, weak signal networks, and low device intelligence. Because of this the
ecosystem is vulnerable to automated service discovery. In such an environment
automatic execution of software and storage of sensitive data may lead to a higher level
of compromise potential (Cha et al., 2009). Needed is a workable level of encryption on
all communications between the device and server that takes the device limitation into
consideration and protects against the attacking of sensitive functions within the M2M
device.
Expected and Actual results
As we expected, it is possible to capture sensitive information that is outbound or
sent to the device. However, the data itself is protected by the communication protocol
security policy. Actual results proved that data is protected in the cellular network
because of the secure communications protocols, access and authentication methods that
are provided by the SIM Card. Knowledge gain included that if encryption is turned on
then all transfer communication is protected, however, as expected, when off,
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information is transferred in the clear. Without proper communication encryption the
devices are subject to attacks such as eavesdropping.
Improved requirement
It is important and recommended that there is no exposed sensitive data and that
protections are in place to prevent unauthorized entities from using this data for
illegitimate purposes, transmitted data should be deleted from the device. Eavesdropping
of cryptographic resources discloses identities and exposes knowledge of sensitive
information. The ease of eavesdropping during prototype testing revealed that poor
authorization and authentication and broken cryptography are vulnerabilities with M2M
devices over Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and Cellular. It is expected the other radio technologies,
such as ZigBee are just as vulnerable but more investigation is recommended as future
research. Eavesdropping testing found that the M2M device service-communication
protocols that connect the device to the gateway are vulnerable as described (Kylanpaa,
Rantala, Merilinna, & Nieminen, 2013). In addition, as reported Ren, Yu, Ma, and Ren
(2013), all real-time, wireless communication-oriented overlay networks, like M2M
capillary systems and federated systems, operate within “registration based” versus
“location lookup quire” architectures. This architecture requires special security
requirements because vulnerabilities may result in a breach of security from real-time
eavesdropping on data transfer and messaging.
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Eavesdropping
Also, results found that the feasibility of eavesdropping on the M2M Service
Layer does expose messages between internal components and the available
cryptographic resources that may expose confidential or private information.
Expected and Actual results
The network and device tasks are separate from each other by the various inside
security systems including the SIM cards and OS security containers. However, when
testing over cellular there are known weakness in the GSM protocol stack that is
exploitable and makes eavesdropping possible. These protocol weaknesses also may lead
to jamming, false base station impersonation and cipher vulnerabilities in GSM.
Improved requirement
Layered security at chip design is required, such as a layered approach will
blanket the device and focus on the device as the secure endpoint from the component
level. Also, applications should have a separation of functions that prevent tasks from
being hijacked, which would make them less vulnerable to eavesdropping.

Jamming
M2M ecosystems connect to various types of radio frequency networks. An
attacker may purchase commercially available jamming devices with enough power to
jam a radius or radio ranges from a few feet to over a mile.
Expected and Actual results
It is found that jamming attacks do block and degrade the radio channels that
connect the M2M device to the base station and Wi-Fi access points. These attacks cause
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a Denial-of-Service attack towards the device. This is an “over-the-air” attack and is
executed by either sending strong signals over the same frequencies used by the device or
by directly consuming the channels available at the base station. Actual results prove that
the injection of RF amplification, noise, and spurious connections effectively disrupts the
communications between the device and the cell tower. In other words, jamming denies
service of the radio spectrum to the cellular network within range of the M2M devices
and forces the device to seek a signal making the device vulnerable to a false base station
attack.
Improved Requirement
M2M devices are low power devices that are vulnerable to both active and
passive jamming attacks that degrade or completely block all communications in a
prescribed area of operations. It is recommended that in critical communication
scenarios, anti-jamming techniques be deployed such as a gateway with hopping signals
for RF transport or multi-radio (ZigBee, Wi-Fi, and Cellular) capabilities are used.

Network Impersonation/False Base Station
It is possible to attack a legitimate GSM network with a modified Cellular Base
Station (Fake Base Station). The goal is to exploit the weakness in M2M devices when
the device seeks the strongest radio signal from the GSM network. Once locked on to the
strongest RF signal, the device camps on the false base station. The false base station
assigns radio channels that look legitimate to the device. The target device is then out of
reach of the authentic carrier’s paging signals. The device registers to that network,
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believing it is locked on the serving network, such an attack is comparable to radio
jamming and is very difficult to counteract effectively in any radio system (3GPP, 2002).
Also, a compromised base station can act as a repeater. In repeater mode, the
attack platform functions as a relay for requests to the legitimate network. These systems
are located in-between the network and the target user, causing a Man-in-the-Middle
scenario. In this case the legitimate service requests and/or paging messages for the
target M2M device can be modified or ignored by the attacking system. In the security
architecture of most wireless systems, there is no prevention mechanism against the false
BTS relaying messages. As previously noted the device is only seeking authentication.
Expected and Actual results
As expected it was found that in the security architecture of 2G/3G cellular, there
is no prevention mechanism against the false base station relaying messages. As
previously noted the device is only seeking authentication. During actual testing, results
proved that transmitted packets could be received at the device leading to the
impersonation of the network. This is the capability whereby the intruder type system
sends signaling and/or authentication data to the device in an attempt to make the device
believe the authentication originate from known good network. However, this is a known
problem with Wi-Fi, 2G and 3G cellular networks and leads to a false base station
(cellular) or rogue access point (Wi-Fi), once the device is locked onto an attack system
the vulnerabilities with in the communication protocols can be targeted (3GPP, 2001).
Improved requirement
M2M device should have firmware that detects and fingerprints all connected
network characteristics.

74

Risky Communication Protocols
Weak communication protocol design leads to session injection (Fuzzing) and
exposes vulnerabilities and other weaknesses in the transport layer. Protections against
client side injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs were identified during
testing and a needed countermeasure for M2M devices is required. Alteration of M2M
communication protocols and messaging between devices and gateways were proven to
be vulnerable as described by Sheng et al., (2013). This validates, the Chen and Ma
(2014), statement that the different communication protocols presently in use within the
wireless and wire-lined systems will cause a protocol security gap. This gap may
potentially lead to a threat against the M2M ecosystem. Protocol level device attacks
include Man-in-the-Middle and Denial-of-Service attacks. Exploitation of network
services weaknesses and over-the-air management is also vulnerable. When exploring
the transaction layer and its protocols, it was explained that message exchange between
the devices and gateway can be altered in the M2M ecosystem by forcing the device off
the core network and executing fuzzing attacks as described by Chen and Ma, (2014).
Expected and Actual results
The device to gateway communications defaults to the cellular 3G protocols and
authentication method when a 3G SIM is used for access and authentication, protecting
against known 2G vulnerabilities. However, actual results proved that the device can
then be forced back to 2G, allowing manipulation of the interaction between the device
and network. Knowledge gained included that the devices with the GSM/GPRS SIM will
register with the open networks. Also, it was verified that the devices are not resistant to
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GSM fuzzing when flooded with SMS type messages. However, a full suite of created
test cases was not applied for full fuzz testing, this is recommended as future research.
Improved Requirement
It is recommended that protections be placed on the device at each individual
component level, a device is not security if all components are secure at the design stage.
These added active security protections would protect the device’s operational
environment and will restrict access to data, protect message transport and secure
firmware access.

Messaging Manipulation
Any alteration or manipulation of the messaging protocol may lead to the
readability of sensitive information or modification of message content (Chen & Ma,
2014). Replay Messaging facilitates false base station roaming because of improper
session handling and lack of transport layer protection (Latvakoski et al., 2014).
Latvakoski et al., (2014) adds that the transport data, signaling data, and control data
require added security measures for correct transmission of messages. This data passes
between the devices and gateways through the physical layer or protocol layers. If the
protocol is compromised, all services are affected.
Expected and Actual results
We found that when a replay attack occurs an attacker can copy messages
between devices and gateways and use them to defeat authentication. Replay attacks
damage transaction information by allowing for the modification, insertion, or deletion of
legitimate user data or signaling message structures. Leading to the discovery of the
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device because of the lack of identity mechanism and lack of protection against deceptive
or fraudulent message content. As expected, result concluded that the attack can exploit
the lack of protection in the communications service layers and that this lack might lead
to replay or playback of network data transmissions. Also, actual results concluded that
the devices roam and register with the false base station only when the SIM card is
allowed to drop to 2G cellular coverage. We gained the knowledge that M2M devices
can be compromised and that if a gateway is used as a base station, the gateway can also
act as a repeater. In repeater mode, the attacker may compromise various functions by
requesting data and access into the legitimate network allowing a Man-in-Middle type
attacks.

Untrusted Inputs
When considering the Man-in-Middle type attacks as another version of
unauthorized or corrupted applications of untrusted inputs, these expose vulnerabilities
from unauthorized, corrupted or modified messages to and from M2M devices (Ho, et al.,
2013). Jeon, Lee, Park, and Jeong, (2013) explained that most unknown replay attacks
are not detected at the device level, this will be even more exposed in a mutual cluster
authentication or mesh network architecture environment such as those in a capillary
M2M ecosystem. Unauthorized devices may run software that authorizes functions to
create vulnerabilities that impersonate the network and device management platform
which might expose other connected devices (Liu, 2012).
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Expected and Actual results
We found that the feasibility of an attacker to impersonate the network and device
management platform by temporary failing the input and output communication protocol
is plausible. Once completed the attacker could fail the device by reporting fake device
consumption, breaching privacy, or reporting confidential information; which would lead
to the attacker’s control of remote management functions. As expected the
communications protocols that are utilized by the device have known weaknesses, which
allows for the manipulation of interaction between the device and the end gateway.
Actual results proved, that the gateways provide services via the packet switched
protocols that may be subjected to attack. Other communications protocols like those
between the core-network of the cellular network architecture, outside databases and
networks elements like switch routing and management functions, may also be vulnerable
(Huber and Huber 2002). We gained the knowledge that in M2M ecosystems that are
using primary radio/antenna component for GSM networks, the IMSI catching attack
using the false base station transceiver it is possible to attack in the same manner as that
of mobile phone attacks. As described, the devices see the base station as a legitimate
carrier’s network. Per specification and design, the devices seek the “best” power
received transmission, once found the device transmits its identifier data, such as IMSI
and system interdependencies. The Man-in-the-Middle attack is also possible because of
poor authorization and authentication methods (Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 2013). According
to Kim, Jeong, and Hong (2013), it is difficult to detect or prevent the Man-in-the-Middle
attack in the M2M ecosystem. In IoT, the problem is elevated due to the difficulties of
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managing or controlling each device independently within the ecosystem and the
probability of federated networks and device-to-device communications.
Improved Requirement
It is recommended that new approaches and standards for the ecosystem apply
new security requirements that address the resource constraints of present networks and
device. This vulnerability is possible because of the device inability to detect replay
messaging. The IoT ecosystems lack requirements and methods for protection against
these type attacks.

Situational Recognition
According to Jin (2013), M2M ecosystems lack the proper device situational
recognition within the systems that certifies the platform and message protections.
Today, these systems use identity-based algorithms for situational recognition and a
convergence framework to analyze certification technology. In addition, Man-in-theMiddle attacks target integrity and confidentiality from a messaging standpoint, which
allows the attacker to take over as the core network by representing the gateway to the
device.
Expected and Actual results
As explained and expected, the M2M devices successfully roam to a fake network
that is impersonating a gateway because they look legitimate to the device. Actual results
prove that the Man-in-the-Middle attack vector exists and can be executed from various
devices and tools (i.e. AP or fake AP capability and RF spoofing).
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Improved Requirement
M2M devices require a new and higher level of authentication to protect the endto-end communication and data transmission.

Unintended data leakage
Improper session handling leads to venerable data storage and unintended data
leakage. M2M networks have sector to subsector interdependencies that when threaten
will lead to cascading impacts across domains (Macaulay & Singer, 2011). Improper
message content delivery affects the overall ecosystem environment, because the
information that a message contains included the various contexts of interdependencies.
For this research, interdependencies are defined as types of intelligence that are
actionable, such as asset ownership, location, and device role (Bianchi, 2014). At risk are
the underlying systems and resources that may impose many forms of vulnerabilities on
interdependencies that directly relate to failures of the ecosystems’ critical
infrastructures. For this research, interdependencies are defined, as anything that can be
used as an attack vector and that shares resources with other applications or devices.
Expected and Actual results
As expect it was found that the principle of least privilege is enforced by the
device’s operating system and that all system dependencies are secured to the same or
higher level of assurance as other programs. Actual testing found that no privilege user
information is stored on the devices that were tested. This is also true when reviewing
data logged at the control center; the center applies context awareness and only provides
device level information such as MEID, IMEI, SIM ID and OS VERSION information.
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Improved requirement
It is recommended that context awareness be provided to M2M devices in the
same manner as it is deployed on mobile devices. This means that all stored relevant
information; including the owner of the device, network authentication keys, and other
specific access policies must be protected (Cam-Winget & Didier, 2014). Lack of
context-awareness will break applications such as device authentication and key
generation (Hagar, 2013). If there is a lack of context awareness it threatens how the
device functions over the M2M ecosystems.

Lacking API protections
M2M devices transmit to other devices including sensors, actuator, gateways and
end systems. For successful security and scalability a secure application-programming
interface (API) must be used to ensure that the protocols are protected.
Expected and Actual results
As expected all the running applications used for external communications to the
network functioned as designed. Protection for the authentication and prevention of
manipulation of the messaging protocol are in place at the clients and servers. However,
actual results did show that the devices expectedly will move to rogue access points and
false base stations. Once connected to these networks the device may be accessed using
the vulnerabilities in a published API. The device uses a published API during
communication with the Control Center. Increased knowledge added that when handling
exceptions, such as when the device is moved to a rogue network, there is no error
message sent to or from the Control Center.

81
Improved requirement
A better messaging protocol would apply an “alarm” type message. M2M devices
are being deployed as a “one size fits all” box that will function as a tool for other
devices, gateways, and applications. This increases the risks associated with security,
privacy and data protection.

Buffer Overflows
The application framework of all devices manages the functions that performs
various tasks; like resource management and call management. When an erroneous
condition, such as a buffer overflow, occurs, the device processing power is stressed
beyond the boundaries of the store data buffer limits and may lessen the difficulty of a
buffer overflow condition (Hagar, 2013). This condition leads to extra data overwriting
and failure of the device processor’s memory locations, which causes the device to fail
(Shewale, Patil, Deshmukh & Singh, 2014). A buffer overflow condition attacks corrupt
data, crashes the program, or causes the execution of malicious code. As described by
Hagar (2013), when sending data and messages to various abbreviations of application,
program interfaces (APIs) show no “failed error messages” or device side alarms. All
APIs are designed to have length constraints for the utilization of storage, data locations,
and code. These constraints define execution space and help to find any vulnerabilities
that enable the execution of applications.
Expected and Actual results
As expected the exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities can be exposed.
What is important is at what point and the measurement of “ease of action” of the testing.
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The expected buffer overflow happens at the point where the message is received and the
device tries to store the message. Although, actual results found that no buffer overflow
is found on the prototype devices, it is important to note that the serial data transmission
is very slow and failed. Knowledge gained was that the communications module on the
device has a limited buffer size and the header size fails when bigger files are received;
causing a buffer overflow.
Improved Requirement
It is recommended that limiting the buffer size and using a GET method with
short answer for all requested and using AT COMMANDS for HTTP communication
should be limited based on device function. Increasing the buffer size leads to false data
injection opportunity and increases the likelihood of client side injection (Lu, et al.,
2012). According to Lu et al. (2012), networks and devices like M2M are seriously
threatened by injection attacks.

False Data Injection
These attacks threaten authentication if an attacker can discover the capability of
bypassing administrative privileges. Once discover that attacker can view sensitive
information and can alter contents stored in the device. If the availability of data is
compromised, the authentication process may be defeated. In that case, all sensitive
information on the device is at risk. Increasing this risk opens the device to remote
command execution techniques that can send mass injections to the device by executing a
simple text-based attack and injection vector.
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Expected and Actual results
As expected injection attacks can be mitigated by strong authentication process
such as 2G/3G authentication. However, the small size, low power, and unattended
operations of M2M devices make a false data injection a higher risks because a
compromised M2M device can launch other attacks. Actual results found that various
forms of side-channel attacks can be performed against encryption/decryption algorithms
flaws and vulnerabilities. However, SQL injection attacks against the device produced
no failing results. This is because there are no Web applications running on the devices.
Test against a client side injection attacks and HTML-5 cross-site scripting attacks also
did not fail these devices. However, the fault injection attack, timing attack, EM analysis
attack, and power analysis attack are known cryptographic attacks used against mobile
devices successful. It is probable that these attacks will fail M2M devices due to the
function specific task they perform. Knowledge gained contributed that fault injection
freezes the device CPU. The timing attack was inconclusive based on how long the
device takes to execute commands when the fault injection script is running, causing the
device to reboot. This result is considered a successful DoS attack because it causes the
device to fail the session.
Improved Requirement
M2M device should be task driven and limited to receiving messages and perform
only function related operations to mitigate attack opportunity.
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Lacking Session Management
Session Management failure will lead to improper session handling and broken
authentication because of misconfiguration (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013).
According to Okugawa, Masutani, and Yoda (2005), M2M networks are self-organizing
and composed of scattered small devices that require the survivability of simultaneous
communicating endpoints, the identity of the device is a key to managing the moving
parts of the ecosystem. If the session management or authentication is broken, all
ecosystem functions are at risk of attack (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013).
Vulnerabilities in session authentication protocols lead to integrity and privacy issues
because of key exchange failures and setup integrity flaws. These flaws fail at session
shutdown and within authentication schemes such as logout, account update, and session
timeout and device application methods of ensuring key privacy.
Misconfiguration attacks exploit configuration weaknesses that can fail account
access protections, expose patching flaws, compromise unprotected files and directories,
and grant unauthorized access to the device. Most devices are provided “off-the-shelf”
with unnecessary and unsafe features that are enabled by default, including backdoor
accounts, special access mechanisms, and incorrect permissions. Researchers have
compromised device security configuration by reviewing the unauthorized access to
sensitive information security policies. This leads to the compromise of the device and
M2M ecosystem by granting unauthorized access to or providing knowledge of devices,
accounts, applications, and platform.
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Expected and Actual results
As we expected we found that the device environments are easily accessible and
exploitable because all applications have permission to run, that based configuration files
are not properly locked down, that clear text reveals username and password type data,
and that database connection strings are set to default settings in configuration.
Additional results found that services and applications can be turned “off and on”
because the root login/password is known. Knowledge gained proves that there are
design and development-related vulnerabilities.
Improved Requirement
Authentication or session management functions must verify device identity.
Also, for message content there should be no exposed accounts, passwords, or session
IDs. During open sessions it is expected that no data is visible other than the
authenticated data and that data should be visible on the device only after the termination
of the session and that all data should be removed from the logs after an inactivity
timeout. An additional requirement is the importance that M2M devices are configured
to perform as few tasks as possible to prevent security misconfiguration. If a device’s
security is misconfigured, then various events can take place that may hinder the device’s
performance (Hongsong, Zhongchuan, & Dongyan, 2011).

Useable Cryptanalysis
On-device platforms include local databases and file systems that usually have
very limited access control protection. System data and credential are managed and
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stored in applications. Access to these internal systems must only be granted after
explicit confirmation of the requesting entity.
Expected and Actual results
As expected cryptanalysis on the device requires improvements and needed are
new methods to protect message context and secure plaintext data transport for low
power/battery operated devices. M2M devices lack encryption algorithms that do not
require large key sizes and keep data confidential during static events. Actual results
found that the mobility characteristic of a wireless system/platform that a mobile
application runs on, protection of application, user data and system data is very important
in securing the M2M device.
Improved requirement
M2M devices must protect data on the system and must be stored locally, all
information should be encrypted in storage using local key store, and file system
protection should be in place and secure access to nonvolatile memory protected.

Unauthorized access
Valid input of data is required to ensure content is provided to applications
securely (Ellinas, Panayiotou, Kyriakides, & Polycarpou, 2015). It is important that
M2M devices and gateways have the functionality to detect and prevent unauthorized
access to the ecosystem. In the case of ecosystem federation, there is the possibility to
have non-existent communications security between devices, due to lack of requirements
requiring protection against invalid input data and parameters that outline qualifier,
range, and data fields. For mitigation, stronger message authentication is required and
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lightweight encryption should be used to provide confidentiality (Shah, Perrig, &
Sinopoli, 2008; Awad, 2015). The M2M ecosystem passes communications over various
networks and these devices are capable of sending messages and data using protocols
such as HTTP or SIP. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks target events and may allow for
code or data injection that disrupts the communication path (Siewruk, Sredniawa,
Grabowski, & Legierski, 2013). As described it is feasible to use forbidden commands to
bypass filters on a device using alternate forms of messaging syntax, which will cause the
device to fail when processing, this is due to the protocol weakness using a cross-site
scripting process by executing arbitrary commands from SMS messages.
Expected and Actual results
As expected the ability to bypass filters where “scripts” are executed is a
prohibited functionality and all input from the server side is validate. The data-input does
not fail the device when sent as described by the standards. The device validation
application prevents and protects unauthorized input from infecting other on-board
applications. Actual results employ automated tools and scripts in a non-reduced time
frame and led to the potential cross site scripting, verbose errors and forceful browsing as
expected with typically automated tools.
Improved Requirement
Only authorized specific types of data should be sent to and from the device.
Maintenance and control messaging should be completed from a protect platform such as
a firmware over the air (FOTA) platform, that protects the devices.
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Summary
Findings support the hypothesis that the M2M ecosystem is even less understood and
trusted because of unknown vulnerabilities and advanced risks. Conclusions are based on
expected and actual analysis using a prototype approach. Prototyping is a sub-method
within the overall System Development Methodology. The present framework “OWASP
Internet of Things Top 10, (2014)” addresses the field of Internet of Things
vulnerabilities from a risk point of view and is developed from results of polling industry
leaders about the threat landscape. This framework has been offered as a security
template for manufacturers to build better secure products and system developers to
address requirements for M2M ecosystem security, but is focused on the end-to-end
threats as identified in Figure 2. We found that a better Internet of Things security
framework exposes five key vulnerabilities that threaten the M2M device. Holmlid and
Evenson (2007) explain that prototyping explores future reality. By applying distinguish
analysis of testing results, we validated the theoretical framework. Then we improved the
framework with additional tested enchantments that addresses the threats as depicted in
Figure 2. Using analysis, we validated the prototype testing, using the theoretical
framework and “literature reviewed” expected results. Actual results from testing were
then extracted and used for the final design of the New Security Framework and the
discovery next generation threats facing M2M devices. Additionally, the hypothesis that
“vulnerabilities are transferred to next technologies” is supported; based on expected and
actual testing results. We found that M2M devices do lack secure authentication, session
key exchange schemes, and adequate cryptographic storage for small packet
transmission.

89

Figure 2. Threat Framework (Horton, 2014)

M2M devices lack these because the devices have low power requirements,
insufficient processing ability, and associated resource constraints. The ability and ease
of finding keys, viewing clear text copies of data and accessing channels automatically
without decrypting data threatens the secure cryptographic storage. The highest threat to
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M2M devices is Denial of Service, which is triggered by weak legacy communication
protocols and known radio-side vulnerabilities. As stated, the System Development
Methodology used for this research is based on building blocks. The blocks were
constructed in 3 Phases. Chapter 4 was the Prototyping phase where the primary and
secondary analysis took place. The research performed in the Prototyping phase helped
build the required “knowledge” of vulnerabilities and allowed for the “discovery” of
problems threatening M2M devices, which then directed the development of the final
framework shown in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Guided by the systems development research methods, the purpose of this study
was to develop a validated and improved security framework for M2M devices that
addresses the threat landscape of the Internet of Things. This study included a history of
Wireless Systems technology development, a comprehensive review of the literature of
the vulnerabilities and threats to these systems and analysis of present security
frameworks for IoT. The study also included real-world prototype testing and an analysis
approach as a sub-method of the systems development research methodology, this
approach identified threats, vulnerabilities and needed requirements for improved
security of M2M devices. The approach led to the development of the final security
framework that foundationally focuses on the device’s required functions versus actual
capabilities of the devices tested and benchmarked within the tested ecosystem.
The literature review and data analysis results enabled the discovery of and
provided gained knowledge to draw specific conclusions and directed the development of
the improved security framework. The final framework can be replicated and used by
M2M device manufactures, IoT systems developers and security architects for guidance
in securing the overall IoT ecosystem and the M2M devices. Chapter 5 presents
conclusions, implications, and recommendations for future research and concludes with a
summary of the research study.
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Conclusions
The following conclusions are drawn from the review of the literature and the
appropriate results from the systems analysis. Table 2 represents the theoretical model on
present risks believed to threaten the IoT ecosystem, followed by a short description of
the major categories as described by the OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Risks (2014).

Table 2. IoT Theoretical Top 10 Risks
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The above model identifies risks associated across the IoT ecosystems domains.
Table 3 below offers an improved model of the Top 5 risks that threaten the M2M
devices that will operate within the IoT. This model is functional and is formulated from
real-world testing and drawn by content from Chapter 3 and results from Chapter 4.

Table 3. Top 5 Functional Risks and Vulnerabilities
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Table 3 categorizes the five high-level risk domains related to M2M devices and
identifies weakness from the M2M device’s perspective. This model provides a checklist
of concepts that leads to stronger protections for the M2M devices and processes.
Highlighted are five key categories where technical vulnerabilities have been found and
observed during the prototyping phase.
These categories include:
The “Communications Network Risks” showing that M2M devices are highly
vulnerable to legacy wireless network attacks. M2M devices must be capable of
gathering information and delivering that information reliably and securely (Bartoli et al.,
2011). The present protocol suite exhibits vulnerabilities that hinder performance, and
network reliability, these vulnerabilities include the weakness of the transport layer and
include, RF jamming and eavesdropping attacks. M2M devices are vulnerable to many
of the same “Applications Risks” that threaten Mobile and Smartphone devices.
However, the IoT architecture is dependent on many technologies from different
domains, this makes the M2M devices less secure because of lacking identification,
authentication and authorization for interoperability across capillary networks within the
domains. Present technologies do not scale across federated networks and various IoT
ecosystems because of lacking standardization efforts and reliable system interfaces (Wu,
et al., 2011).
Some M2M devices are designed to perform solo to limited tasks making the
devices vulnerable to “Devices Limitations Risks”. These risks include low and limited
data storage capabilities, low processing ability, limited availability of power resources
and little situational recognition. However, these vulnerabilities also exist between

95
devices and gateways in capillary networks where many devices may communicate with
each other proving again that lacking interoperability and management capabilities, leads
to even greater limitations and risk. The very nature of the physical environment that
many M2M devices are deployed within causes a significant threat to the device because
harsh conditions lead to worsening resources, new failing points and attack vectors. Plus,
protocols for cryptanalysis and API protections in IoT are not strong enough and
efficiently tested from the device side (Hue, et al., 2013).
M2M devices lack strong “control” mechanisms and attacks may lead to the
malicious takeover of the physical device. These include messaging manipulation from
untrusted inputs and unauthorized access from secure session management. Lack of
well-defended requirements and standards solutions cause an unsuitable system design
and management solution (Foschini, Taleb, Corradi, & Bottazzi, 2011).
The reached goal of this research was to create a better security framework for
M2M device security development. Chapters 3 and 4 provide an outline for framework
development. The framework illustrated in Figure 3 is created from multiple
perspectives included in the system development process. This approach provided a
means for developing and applying a security design method for M2M devices by
applying the System Development Methodology. For this research, a mollified 3-phase
approach was applied. Phase 1 conducted a preliminary analysis and foundation
knowledge gathering, Phase 2 conducted the system analysis for developing stronger
security requirements recommendations and, Phase 3 developed the new framework. The
framework uses “prototyped” observed results supported by results extracted from
literature review to identify vulnerabilities and strengthen the device specifications and
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then provided a formal representation of specifications and requirements in the form of
the illustrated frameworks (Figure 2, Table 3, and Figure 3).
The basic building blocks of this framework are the “use cases” as defined in
Chapter 2. For this research the “use cases” can be thought of as both the “actor” and
“role” in the development process. From the “use cases”, partial knowledge is gained
about the role that the M2M device must fulfill. Additional knowledge in gained from
calculating the “Business Logic” that must be performed by the M2M Device. The
“Business Logic” serves as the “perspective” of the actor. Once the knowledge gained
stage is completed and combined, the first “action” is determined and the function of the
M2M device was determined. In this framework, the “action” determines the “Functional
Classification” of the device role (Godfrey et al., 2015). These steps complete Phase 1 of
the System Development Methodology.
In Phase 2 the present frameworks were analyzed, problems found and improved
requirements then defined. For this research, the present framework for M2M security
that was interpreted and analyzed was the OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 (2014).
The test scenarios for diagnosing problems with present technologies were then realized
and recommend requirements generated using the prototyping development approach.
Prototyping is an experimental process that is suitable for both gaining present systems
operational experience and for the discovery of new requirements identification
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2015).
Phase 3 includes the design and development of the final framework. The
research completed the development and documentation of the system by preparing a
framework that contributes to the overall solution of security for next-generation devices.
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The framework presented in Figure 3 contributes the missing knowledge needed to fill
the gap between the intersection of human interface, wireless, and M2M device risks and
security countermeasures (Riahi, et al., 2014). The framework solves the stated problem
by developing and focusing on devices “functions and capabilities”, this effort (a)
adequately considers restrictions and constraints; (b) identifies significant shortfalls; and
(c) led to a more thorough and detailed M2M security framework.

Final Functional Security Framework for M2M Devices

Function: Goal

Knowledge Building Blocks
Use Case

Outline Business Logic

Function: Roll
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Device
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Critical

Life Safety
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Systems Analysis and Requirements
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Figure 3. Final Functional Framework

Security
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Implications
Figure 3, shown above, illustrates the improved framework. This study helped
identify the present vulnerabilities in M2M devices and assist in the development of new
security requirements for the IoT ecosystem. The results of the study and the review of
the literature guided the design of the new security framework for M2M devices. This
new framework provides needed direction and exposes threats that must be taken into
consideration for secure device development and ecosystem implementation.
This study also contributed to the body of knowledge of systems design by
applying the development research method to address the research problem of proper
functional security in next generation technologies. Although the research was focused
on the method of development and the creation of a security framework, an additional
goal was reached of discovering, restructuring and presenting the M2M device top five
risks and threats framework.

Recommendations
Future research could be conducted based on the results outlined in Chapter 4 of
this study, many of the tests proved the feasibility of attack. Results found that many of
the vulnerabilities are caused by past technology vulnerabilities and known threats.
Present communications protocols that will be implemented in future IoT ecosystems are
flawed with both security and privacy concerns. The possible development and
redesigned or even better, new communications protocols, will prove to have value to the
industry. This study also focused on the development of a new framework or risk and
research could be conducted on specific vulnerabilities and development of
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countermeasures address exposed risk. Such research would provide deeper discovery
and furnish needed requirements for device hardware and software design.

Summary
At present, there are many security problems with IoT ecosystems and, in
particular, the M2M devices that are designed for these systems (Lai et al., 2012). This
research fills the gap that exists between the past approaches for security framework
development and understanding, by identifying how these new technologies must differ
from past and present technologies. The past techniques for developing security
requirements do not adequately consider the use of new technologies, which weakens
countermeasure implementations. Developed by this research is a security framework
designed for requirements development. This research provides a framework design
method for identifying next-generation security concerns and processes for comparing,
contrasting and evaluating non-human device security protections used in the IoT
ecosystem.
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Appendix A: Real-World Test
Appendix A
Real-World Test

The below tables outline the test that were executed to verify device compliance,
function, and capability as required by the defined Use Cases. The results then were used
to build the Risk, Vulnerability and Functional Security Design Framework.
Test 1
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview
Issue

Description
Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain

Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact

Action

Baseline vulnerability scans are directed towards Weak Server Side
Controls.
Literature explains that vulnerability scans identify open ports. Also
reported is the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, the device operating
system, software and services that are running on the device.
The vulnerability scanner used for testing was a software-based scanner.
Devices are vulnerable to application failures and open communication
ports that lead to DoS attacks. Scanning for known vulnerabilities
allowed for the discovery of access opportunities.
We executed scanning to find vulnerable access points on various
devices running on an isolated network.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP,
2014).
Application service providers, manufacturers of devices, the M2M
device/gateway, management providers, M2M service providers,
network operators, and user/consumers.
We found that this test impacts the device communication protocols
within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for
authentication. Also found was that the wireless network and
configuration settings are impacted if vulnerabilities are discovered
because the privacy and security of messaging is at risk.
For the purpose of this research the vulnerability scanner was
considered the server. As the server, the scanner was used to send and
scan the device. In particular to this research the events of interest were
host discovery, port scanning, OS detection and service discovery.
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Expected
Result
Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

We expected that the standard behavior for each of the events would be
capable of being identified on each device.
We found that normal various TCP and UDP ports were opened on the
M2M type devices as well as the other network connected devices.
We gained knowledge that because the devices are prototyped the ports
can be turned off or on. However, for the device to communicate
applications such as for SMS messaging must remain opened and did
leave ports vulnerable to various known SMS attacks. However, being
able to scan a device is not a bad thing. Discovering vulnerabilities or
configuration errors results in understanding where intrusions can occur
and leads to the development of better countermeasures.
A better-designed device allows for the scanning and review of process.
Quarantining the devices applications and revoking the permissions for
the applications closes the exposed ports. Only ports that are required
for data transfer are exposed. Over the cellular network, updating the
device communications module to 3G and placing a 3G or above smart
card into the devices increases security and strengthens protection
against server side control attacks.

Service-Layer Keys
Test 2

We directed Test 2 towards insufficient transport layer protection and
improper session handling.
What Is Tested We tested the availability of long-term service-layer keys and the
and Analyzed? storage of keys on the devices as called for by (oneM2M Partners,
2014).
Overview
The services layer consists of all the services that the manufacturer
makes available on the devices or is preinstalled by device peripherals.
The long-term service-layer consists of keys that may be discovered
while they are stored on the devices. If discovered, these keys may be
copied and used against the device or gateway during other attacks
(Ukil, Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013).
Issue
The services layer is highly vulnerable to attack because the data within
the layers provides the business functionality that allows the devices’
supported communications and messaging to and from the gateway. If
copied, the long-term service-layer keys may be used to impersonate
M2M devices to the gateways or vice versa (Latvakoski et al., 2009).
Description
When “long-term service-layer keys are stored within the M2M device
or M2M gateways”, they may be discovered during scanning by
unauthorized entities (oneM2M, 2014). For example, transport layer
security (TLS) uses a cryptographic system with two keys to encrypt
data (Hersent, Boswarthick, & Elloumi, 2011). Once the keys are
discovered, they can be used for illegitimate purposes, such as false
authorization and authentication. There are various methods for
discovering open and available keys. Hardware probing methods include
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the monitoring of internal processes or simply the reading of memory
contents. According to Lu, O’Neill, and McCanny (2010), DPA is a
widely studied side-channel attack however this attack is outside the
scope of this research. They recommend that Random Delay Insertion
(RDI) be deployed as a countermeasure technique. However, M2M
devices run weak cryptographic processes and do not have the resources
for increased countermeasures that will reduce the risk of DPA attacks.
All

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
Security Domain channels, network attacks, application security, application environment
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP,
2014)
Affected
Application service providers, manufacturer of devices, M2M
Stakeholders
device/gateway, management providers, M2M service providers,
network operators, and user/consumer
Architecture
We found that this test impacts the device communication protocols
Impact
within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for
authentication. The wireless network and configuration settings are
impacted if vulnerabilities are found, because the privacy and security of
messaging is at risk.
Action
1. Use the V scan to discover IP address.
2. Ping open ports, this test’s the security of the communication
protocols
3. Establish a wireless connection with which to send input data
and functions toward the device by using ARPping and verify
working device.
4. Scan again with Nmap to see the device using Wi-Fi Internet
connection
5. Observe the tool log for data computation bugs.
6. Document the device performance and responses from the
device.
7. Report any failures or open known vulnerabilities that effect
policy and enforcement.
Expected Result This is a deep analysis of the ports open on a running device. The test
exposes the device to authorization vulnerabilities. We expected that the
tools would report no known security vulnerabilities against the open
ports. These devices run limited applications such as GPS location
tracking, which only requests location data when needed. There are
inherent limitations to resources on these devices; data should be stored
read-only and limited in storage time.
Actual Result We found that because these devices are prototyped devices and are
built using the Raspberry Pi version 2. These are unsecure devices.
Testing layer 2 with port pinging and scanning showed open ports and
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Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

device information including the TCP IP Address and MAC.
The ARP request determined that the host is alive, also the MAC
address of the devices is returned. However the RPi are low processing
devices and repeated testing freezes the device and takes it off network.
Also ICMP echo request using Scapy flood the device at whatever port
is specified in the ping command. This flood message stresses the CPU
to MAX usage.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Stored Management and Control Frames
Test 3
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture

Test 3 was directed towards Network Layer Protection and Insecure
Data Storage.
The importance of deleting stored management and control frames on
Layer 2 of M2M devices, as described by Hersent, Boswarthick, and
Elloumi (2011)
Management and control frames are directly related to service-layer
keys and focused on the Layer 3 frames because M2M data will service
three requirements: massive data analysis, real-time data analysis, and
deep data analysis (Kitagami, Yamamoto, Koizumi, & Suganuma,
2013). In many cases, open source software such as SQLite and R will
be used to pass data in small- and medium-sized M2M service systems.
Information stored in the devices can be detected and used by an
attacker to compromise these systems. The device is also at risk for
being spoofed or turned into an attacking device, a fake access point, or
a fake wireless bridge. Management and control frames must be
protected to protect the protocol stack (Lin, 2008).
Literature explains that unprotected protocol stacks may lead to denial
of service (DoS), Man-in-the-middle (MinM), and similar attacks. This
vulnerability can prevent the operation of the overall M2M service.
Test the possibility of locating service-layer keys within the protocol
stack and the device. We tried to discover if these keys could be reused,
deleted, or changed. All systems have management commands that can
be used and attack vectors that can perpetrate key-storage functions of
M2M devices and M2M gateways.
All
Authentication, application security, and network security

Application service providers, manufacturer of devices and gateways,
service providers, network operator, and user/consumer
If long-term keys that are transferred over the service-layer experience
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Impact
Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained
New
Requirement.

compromise of storage, this impacts the constraints on the device.
1. Used ping tools to ping and to send ICMP echo request
2. This should indicate that the host corresponding to the
address is alive
3. Generate the test inputs. These are random messages with
test strings of characters.
4. Send various messages to the device over the air using both
the GSM/GPRS and Wi-Fi networks
5. Test the Protocols IP, ICMP, ARP, & RIP and uses Routers
as its device flood test the ICMP against the device not router
6. Using hping3 to perform layer 3 discovery
7. Use Scapy to discover layer 4 User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) transport
protocols
8. Document the error logs from the control center and “real”
errors that relate to device management and architectural
controls.
We expected to discover that the authentication frames and open data
transfer may be used for Layer 3 attacks such as DoS and Man-in-theMiddle attacks. These tests should find a weakness in the various
protocols. There are known vulnerabilities in the GSM stack. It is
expected that sending different configuration messages to the device on
each port will expose the GSM vulnerabilities.
We found that running hping3 does successfully scan layer 3 and layer 4
and reports the device IP. Using Scapy to perform layer 4 discovery
reported that the host is alive. However, only open and not closed TCP
ports reported an ACK to messaging.
The Scapy test fails/locks all 3 RPi devices when a particular port is
addressed in the execution string.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Software-to-Hardware Signal Interface
Test 4
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

We directed Test 4 towards unintended data leakage and improper
session handling.
M2M device software-to-hardware signal interface (Bernardi,
Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013).
Many M2M devices run a small version of Linux as an operating
system. Components such as cameras and Wi-Fi nodes are run and
accessed through files that are usually located in the /dev directory of
the OS. These files communicate directly with the kernel driver that is
in current communication with the component hardware. All
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Issue
Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact

Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

components must communicate transparently, regardless of their
hardware and software (Bernardi, Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013).
Literature review explains that these files are easy to expose and, once
found, can lead to vulnerability (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006).
We note that M2M devices’ use open standards that are tested for
transparency. The use of open standard makes the device vulnerable to
attackers. Because these devices are usually built from commercial offthe-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, attackers seek knowledge to
expose open vulnerabilities so that they can disable the fail-safe
mechanisms (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006).
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, application security, disaster recovery
process, and internal security (CISSP, 2014)
Service provider, manufacturer, device management system, network
operator, and user/consumer
The critical infrastructure includes Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) networks like natural disaster early warning
systems and crime prevention cameras. A range of vulnerabilities
threatens them: from equipment failures to terrorist attacks (Igure,
Laughter, & Williams, 2006).
1. First discover the OS using Nmap
2. Test input, output, and measurement data considerations.
3. Use p0f to analyze a Wireshark capture file.
4. Identify input devices with ranges and resolutions of values.
5. Identify output devices with ranges and resolutions of values.
6. Define the full range of input disturbances (unexpected
system inputs).
7. Send messages Nmap to the device input ports to discover
Service fingerprinting.
8. Observe possible output disturbances that occur when
unexpected system inputs are received.
9. Review and analyze device performance.
10. Read the error log from the control center and document
errors.
We expected that the OS is reported correctly and all device port that
are open and closed are disclosed. As environmental conditions change,
the RF signal, in or out data, and messaging should all continue to
match a specified value as described by the standards.
We found that the tests run successfully over Wi-Fi and GPRS showed
the required and needed information for ensure a successful penetration
test.
We gain the knowledge that from the reported IP addresses, active
machines, and open ports are identified from the target devices. The
services running on specific ports do ensure successfully routing. Using
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New
Requirement.

the open source threat assessment tool the complexity and severity of a
single point of failure of the device can be identified as explained by
Igure, Laughter, and Williams, (2006).
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Interface Attack
Test 5
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description
Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

We directed Test 5 towards the security decisions via untrusted inputs
and insecure data storage.
We looked for the discovery of human user interface attack and
tampering resistance notification as described by Hagar (2013).
Literature explains that the M2M systems are designed to function
without human interaction. However, M2M message traffic, data
transfer, and content are influenced by human-based traffic, such as
location data, billing data, and personalized content. The M2M device
must also be monitored, repaired, and managed by humans (Cha, Shah,
Schmidt, Leicher, & Meyerstein, 2009).
We understood that M2M devices may be targets of tampering,
repurposing, or modification. There is a need for failure indicators, such
as on/off settings, hardware status, and network control or alarms. These
false indicators will cause an operator to take action on this information.
If such an attack takes place, an attacker can then perform remote
hacking on management or maintenance interfaces and fully
compromise the device and platform.
Test the ability to discover tampering and flaws in the monitoring
system that could lead to vulnerabilities in the device-user interaction.
All
Access control, application security, and device security and control
platform
Application service provider, manufacturer, service provider, system
administrator, network operator, and user/consumer
M2M service infrastructure and device
1. Use the Control Center to apply inputs and verify that the
devices is connected correctly.
2. Make error messages that inform the human user of an alarm.
3. Identify hosts that are discovered by UDP probes
4. This sets up a place to insert overflow input to the buffers
when with false messages by sending messages from the
control center to the device.
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5. Define the inputs that create these outputs.
6. Test these input/output combinations.
7. Determine what the outputs are and then attempt to force
invalid human interaction.
Expected
Result
Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

We expected that the UDP port that is open will be discovered.
We found that the port reported open is 2165. Running amap identifies
that only port 22 is open until closed.
We gained knowledge that it is very easy to identify hosts using
discovery against UDP and probing an isolated task. Hping3 uses ICMP
host unreachable responses to identify live hosts with UDP requests.
An additional scan using Nmap report all open ports. This discovery
allows for fingerprinting of services. Testing discover that port 22
(SSH) is opened on the device but the other ports are closed. SSH is
opened at install of the OS and not closed at reboot.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Unrestricted File Upload/Download
Test 6
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description
Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected

We directed Test 6 towards improper session handling and unrestricted
file upload/download.
Unrestricted file upload to M2M infrastructure from the device
equipment (Flick & Morehouse, 2010; Skianis, 2013).
Literature explains that the vulnerability affects databases, operating
systems, and applications that are developed for internal use and in
M2M devices that are connected to the Internet with unrestricted access.
These platforms lack restrictions on the size or number of uploaded
files. Files that are too large will consume resources and freeze the
device operations (Flick & Morehouse, 2010). When open access to
SSH of FTP servers and found device data storage is at risk.
We understand that when an attacker uploads or transfers files of
dangerous types using an automated processed within the M2M
ecosystem via open FTP ports this allows device compromise.
We explains that attacker may use a compromised device to upload or
transfer dangerous type files that can be used to hurt the ecosystem.
All
Access control, communication channels, network attacks, application
security, application environment and security controls, encryption
concepts, and capabilities of information systems (CISSP, 2014)
Application service provider, manufacturer of device, network service
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Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

provider, system administrator, network operator, and user/consumer
M2M service infrastructure

Expected
Result
Actual Result

We expected that the FTP server will block the “input file”.

Knowledge
Gained
New
Requirement.

Detailed in Chapter 4.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Validate vulnerabilities using HTTP interaction
Create an “input file” to send and retrieve from the device.
Observe the network with scanner tools like “Wireshark”.
Send data file from control server to the device.
Validate vulnerabilities with HTTP interaction
Review and closely analyze the results, looking for obvious
crashes.

Described in Chapter 4.

Offered in Chapter. 4 & 5.

Discovery of Sensitive Data
Test 7
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected

We directed Test 7 towards broken cryptography and lack of binary
protections.
The “discovery of sensitive data in M2M devices or M2M gateways”
according to (Pandey, Choi, Kim, & Hong, 2011; oneM2M, 2014).
M2M devices, such as sensors, collect data that is sensitive, including
toxic levels of poison, temperature of machinery, and personal
consumer data. The execution of sensitive functions and the storage and
transfer of this information must be protected.
According to Pandey, Choi, Kim, and Hong (2011), M2M has important
characteristics that other ecosystems do not. For example, M2M offers
sleeping devices, low power devices, weak signal networks, and low
device intelligence. Automated service discovery and an environment
for the automatic execution of software and storage of sensitive data
leads to a higher level of compromise potential (Cha et al., 2009).
Literature explains that the level of encryption on all communication
between the device and server is vulnerable by attacking the execution
of sensitive functions within the M2M device. Verify the exposed
sensitive data and ensure that protection is in place to prevent
unauthorized entities from using this data for illegitimate purposes.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
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Security
Domain

Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result
Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained
New
Requirement.

channels, application security, application environment and security
controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information systems,
resource protection, incident response, and internal security (CISSP,
2014)
Application service provider, manufacturer of devices, network
operator, and user/consumer
The device storage capability for sensitive data and the functions used
by the device to send this data to nodes and gateways
1. Examine target device sensitive information using device
forensic tools such as the Oxygen Forensic Tool Kit.
2. Use the tools to communicate with the device remotely.
3. Perform intensive caches analysis.
4. Browse the cache and retrieve all information.
5. From the network side, place a sniffer into the
communication path between the device and server.
6. Use open source tools to explore the SSL, SSH, and SCP
type protocol. These tools detect and sniff information from
the network.
7. Review the targeted application-received information from
the server, such as dynamic updates, applets, and scripts.
8. Verify that sensitive information is encrypted and protected.
We expected to find that it is possible to capture sensitive information
that is outbound and sent to the device. However, the data itself was be
protected by the protocol security policy.
Detailed in Chapter 4.
Explained in Chapter 4.
Offered in Chapter 4.

Eavesdropping
Test 8
What Is
Tested?
Overview

We directed test 8 towards poor authorization and authentication and
broken cryptography.
Eavesdropping on M2M device service-communications protocols that
connect the device to the gateway (Kylanpaa, Rantala, Merilinna, &
Nieminen, 2013)
According Ren, Yu, Ma, and Ren (2013), all real-time, wireless
communication-oriented overlay networks, like M2M based capillary
systems, might operate within a registration based versus location
lookup quire architecture. This architecture has special security
requirements because vulnerabilities may result in a breach of security
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Issue
Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

from real-time eavesdropping on messaging and data transfer.
Literature explains that eavesdropping of cryptographic resources
discloses identities and exposes knowledge of sensitive information.
We examined the feasibility of “eavesdropping on M2M Service Layer”
(oneM2M, 2014). Expose messages between components and the
available cryptographic resources must protect confidential or private
information.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014)
M2M service provider, devices manufacturer M2M device/gateway
management entities, network operator, and user/consumer
Radio network and device controls
1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH)
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic
through a private GSM network.
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device
testing.
3. The Raspberry Pi runs:
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool
Python: for programming scripts
4. Force device to attach to the GSM network. This takes
advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices:
M2M devices to the M2M gateway
M2M gateway to M2M devices
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending
authentication messages.
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false
identity data.
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.
9. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read
sensitive information or modify message content.
We expected that the network and device tasks would be separated from
each other by various systems. There are known weakness in GSM that
can be exploited. However, M2M devices and applications should have
a separation of functions that prevent tasks from being hijacked, which
would make them less vulnerable to eavesdropping as explained by
3GPP (2002).
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Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained
New
Requirement.

We found that packets can be downloaded leading to the impersonation
of a user this may be caused by the intruder sends signaling and/or user
data to the network, as a fake network.
We gained the understanding that the intruder may be able to eavesdrop
on signaling and data connections associated with other users.
However, this is possible over various radio technologies.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Communication Protocols (Fuzzing)
Test 9
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

We directed Test 9 towards transport layer protection, client side
injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs.
Alteration of M2M communication protocols and messaging between
devices and gateway, as described by Sheng, Yang, Yu, Vasilakos,
McCann, and Leung (2013).
The M2M ecosystem has complex deployment characteristics. New
approaches and standards are required for the system to meet security
requirements due to the resource constraints of present networks. Any
alteration or manipulation of the messaging protocol may lead to the
readability of sensitive information or modification of message content
(Chen & Ma, 2014).
According to Chen and Ma (2014), the different communication
protocols presently in use within the wireless and wire-lined system will
cause a protocol security gap. This gap may potentially lead to a threat
against the M2M ecosystem. Protocol device attacks include Man-inthe-Middle attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, exploitation of
network services weaknesses, and over-the-air management attacks.
Explore the transaction layer and its protocols that handle message
exchange between the devices and gateway by altering the M2M device
and forcing the device off the core network.
All
Availability, access control, communication channels, and network
attacks (CISSP, 2014).
Management entities, service provider, network operator, and
user/consumer
Radio network and device controls.
1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH)
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic
through a private GSM network.
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device
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3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Expected
Result

Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

testing
The Raspberry Pi runs:
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool
Python: for programming scripts
Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.
Eavesdrop on the following:
The M2M devices to the M2M gateway
The M2M gateway to M2M devices
Test the protections in the communication protocols by
sending authentication messages.
Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by
performing unexpected actions such as sending false identity.
Manipulate messaging protocols to fake a known network to
the device.
Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive
information or modify message contents.

As we expected the device to gateway communications defaulted to the
cellular 3G protocols and authentication method. This will protect
against known 2G vulnerabilities. However, if the device can be forced
back to 2G, then weakness-allowing manipulation of the interaction will
be seen.
We found that the Scapy tool is able to scan the device for open ports
and determined that potential target services like GPS/Location and
control center communication ports are open.
Knowledge gained showed that tested devices with GSM/GPRS SIM do
register with the OpenBTS tool and we verified that the devices are not
resistant to GSM fuzzing. Sending test SMS message to device does not
fail the communication module however a full suite of created test cases
has not been applied for full fuzz testing.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Replay Messaging (false Base Station)
Test 10
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

We directed Test 10 towards Improper session handling and transport
layer protection
Replay messaging between devices and gateways as described by
(Latvakoski et al., 2014)
The user’s data, signaling data, and control data require security
measures for correct transmission. This data passes between the devices
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Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

and gateways through the physical layer or protocol layers. If the
protocol is compromised, all services are affected.
Literature contributes that the replay attack occurs when an attacker can
copy messages between devices and gateways and use them to defeat
authentication. Replay attacks damage transaction information by
allowing for the modification, insertion, or deletion of legitimate user
data or signaling message structures.
We tested the feasibility of capturing messages. In order to discover if
there is a possibility of any tracking mechanisms that allow for the
identity of deceptive or fraudulent message content.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, and network attacks (CISSP, 2014)
Service provider and network operator
Radio network and device controls
1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH)
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic
through a private GSM network.
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device
testing.
3. The Raspberry Pi runs:
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool
Python: for programming scripts
4. Force device to attach to the GSM network. This takes
advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices:
M2M devices to the M2M gateway
M2M gateway to M2M devices
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending
authentication messages.
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by
performing unexpected actions, such as send false identity
data.
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.
9. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive
information or modify message contents.
10. Send back captured messages using Python script messages
to change data content.
11. Check the receipt of the repetition messages.
12. Log the capability of attack.
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Result

Actual Result
Knowledge
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As we expected the attack may exploit the lack of protection in the
communications service layers and that this lack will lead to replay or
playback of network data transmissions thus leading to a successful
false bases attack over GSM.
The devices roam and register with false base station.
We gained the knowledge that a compromised BTS can act as a repeater
against the M2M devices. In repeater mode, the attack platform
functions as a relay for requests to the legitimate network. These
systems are located in between the network and the target user. Good
service requests and/or paging messages for the target device are modify
or ignore by the attacking system. In the security architecture of 3G
there is no prevention mechanism against false BTS relaying messages
the device is only seeking authentication.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Unauthorized or Corrupted Applications
Test 11
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain

We directed Test 11 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs and
lack of binary protections.
“Unauthorized or corrupted applications or software in M2M devices”
as explained by (Ho, Jacobs, Meissner, Meyer, Monjas, & Segura,
2013)
Software does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions
in a manner that is required to provide a safe exchange of information. It
is important that applications authenticate successfully to establish
secure channels (Jeon, Lee, Park, & Jeong, 2013).
Literature explains that it is unknown how to detect replay attacks or
mutual cluster authentication within a federated M2M ecosystem.
Unauthorized devices may run software that authorizes functions to
create vulnerabilities that impersonate the network and device
management platform (Liu, 2012).
Furthermore, these test showed that the feasibility of an attacker to
impersonate the network and device management platform by
temporary failing the single input and output communication protocol.
If successful, the attacker could fail the device by reporting fake device
consumption, breaching privacy, or reporting confidential information,
which would lead to the attacker’s control of remote management
functions and systems.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, application
security, application environment and security controls, and internal
security (CISSP, 2014)
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Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result

M2M application service provider, manufacturer of M2M devices
and/or M2M gateways, M2M device/gateway management entities,
M2M service provider, and user/consumer
M2M service provider’s domain, M2M devices, and M2M gateways

1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH)
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic
through a private GSM network.
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device
testing.
3. The Raspberry Pi runs:
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool
Python: for programming scripts
4. Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices:
M2M devices to the M2M gateway
M2M gateway to M2M devices
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending
authentication messages.
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false identity
data.
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.
9. Manipulate an authentication protocol.
10. Seek older protocol vulnerabilities.
11. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive
information or modify message contents.
12. Send back captured messages using Python script messages
to change data content.
13. Manipulate client-server interactions.
14. Check the receipt of the repetition messages.
15. Log the capability of attack.
We expected to find that the communications application running on the
device utilized a secure protocol that does not have weaknesses, which
allows for the manipulation of interaction between the device and the
end gateway.
We found and proved that the packet switched protocols do have known
weakness that will disturb M2M device in this environment. This could
mean that in 2G/3G legacy cellular communications systems that the
relationship between the HLR, VLR, AC and other databases and
networks elements might provide increased vulnerability when dealing
with a mix of domains and crossover protocols (Huber and Huber
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Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

2002).
Knowledge gained included verification that the primary radio/antenna
component on the GSM network is the Base Station Transceiver (BTS)
allows for IMSI catching using a False Base Station Transceiver. The
devices see this base station as a legitimate carrier’s network. This is
because the BTS transmits at a higher power level then the legitimate
BTS. Per specification and design, all Mobile Devices seek the “best”
power received transmission, once found the device transmits its
identifier data, such as IMSI.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

System Interdependencies
Test 12
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

We directed Test 12 towards improper session handling insecure data
storage and unintended data leakage.
M2M system interdependencies threats and cascading impacts
(Macaulay & Singer, 2011)
Proper message content delivery affects the overall ecosystem
environment and the information that a message contains includes all
interdependencies. Interdependencies are defined as types of
intelligence that are actionable, such as asset ownership, location, and
device role (Bianchi, 2014).
Literature explains that the underlying systems and resources may
impose many forms of vulnerabilities on interdependency that directly
relate to failures of the ecosystems’ critical infrastructures (oneM2M,
2013)
We gathered and tested the effects of external interdependencies on the
M2M endpoints from the perspective of the device to the M2M
gateway. For this research, an interdependencies threat is anything that
can be used as an attack vector and shares resources.
All use cases
Application environment and security controls, resource protection,
incident response, patch and vulnerability management, and disaster
recovery process (CISSP, 2014)
Device/gateway management entities and M2M service provider
Principle of least privilege, internal system, and control center
1. Load a malicious resource into the device.
2. Use a bootstrap program to add a program, like J2EE
applications, to simulate malware.
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Expected
Result
Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

3. Verify the application is running and that other component
based applications, such as GPS, are running correctly.
4. Modify the path variable to read and write data to the same
local file store as the component based applications.
5. Include malicious resources that can be transmitted from the
gateway and sent to the device.
6. Observe whether commands can unwittingly be executed on
the device by a remote message or sent application.
As we expected that the device’s operating system and that enforced the
principle of least privilege all system dependencies are secured to the
same or higher level of assurance as other programs.
Nothing found.
We gained the knowledge that no privilege user information is on the
device to manipulate the radio or device parameter outside of acceptable
use. However the screen only shows MEID, IMEI, SIM ID and
VERSION information but this should be acceptable for simple
management.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Context Awareness
Test 13
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview
Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases

We directed Test 13 towards lack of binary protections
M2M device application security with context awareness and the ability
of the device to store relevant information, including the owner of the
device, network authentication keys, and other specific access policies
as described by (Cam-Winget & Didier, 2014)
Context-awareness aims to break applications (Hagar, 2013) such as
device authentication and key generation.
Literature explains that there is a lack of context awareness with the
M2M ecosystems and how they will function. Most M2M devices are
being deployed as a “one size fits all” box that will function as a tool for
other devices, gateways, and applications. This increases the risks
associated with security.
Apply deep packet inspection related to what has been completed on
mobile smart devices. As more and more applications are developed in
the M2M ecosystem, there is a need to consider the other attack
possibilities, such as software test attacks, device-to-device attacks, and
cognitive machines attacks. These attacks take advantage of weaknesses
in the client-server relationship and various protocols that allow for
device communications.
All use cases

118
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Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014)

Expected
Result

As we expected all the running applications used for external
communications to a network did function and fail as defined. For
example, it should not be possible for the authentication protocol to be
manipulated or for the messaging protocols to be spoofed by an
application or other clients or servers.
However, actual results showed that applications do close unexpectedly
and fail the devices.

Actual Result

Application service provider
M2M service provider's domain, M2M devices, and M2M gateways
1. Gather and list the functions and links between applications
and communications protocols.
2. List and map all application tasks and functions.
3. Identify use scenario as based on Use Case requirements.
4. Note the different user types as well as common and
uncommon usages of running applications.
5. Define valid data or input for application and data
transmitted.
6. Define any invalid or valid data as well as input options for
each application.
7. Build a matrix of invalid data inputs and outputs, including
specific data points or values that are common and different.
8. Determine what inputs and outputs expose failures.
9. Test the end-to-end functional tests of the application.
10. Test the app against expected functionality.
11. Compare the results against standard requirements.
12. Identify risk of failure based on Use Cases.

Knowledge
Gained

We gained knowledge that when handling exceptions, an application
should provide an error message.

New
Requirement.

The device should present a message that is relevant to the context of
the application failure.

Man in the Middle
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Test 14
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

We directed Test 14 towards poor authorization and authentication.
The possibility of Man-in-the-Middle attack (Kim, Jeong, & Hong,
2013)
According to Kim, Jeong, and Hong (2013), it is difficult to detect or
prevent the Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack in the M2M ecosystem.
The problem is elevated due to the difficulties of managing or
controlling each device independently within the system.
According to Jin (2013), M2M ecosystems lack proper device
situational recognition within the systems that certifies the platform and
message protections. Today, these systems use identity-based
algorithms for situational recognition and a convergence framework to
analyze certification technology that reply on keys and other sensitive
information. In addition, MitM attacks target integrity and
confidentiality from a messaging standpoint, which allows the attacker
to take over as the Core Network by representing the gateway to the
device.
We executed a Man-in-the-Middle on the device by intruding into a
controlled network. We tried to detect basic flaws by observing the
device’s network traffic, protocol design and application, and the server
configuration. The goal is to expose the lack of security protections of
data in transit over the communication pipe by gaining unauthorized
possession of the device.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014)
Application service provider, M2M gateways, gateway management
entities, network operator, and user/consumer
Radio network
1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH)
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic
through a private GSM network.
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device
testing.
3. The Raspberry Pi runs:
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool
Python: for programming scripts
4. Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices:
M2M devices to the M2M gateway
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M2M gateway to M2M devices
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending
authentication messages.
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false identity
data.
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.
9. Manipulate an authentication protocol.
10. Seek older protocol vulnerabilities.
11. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive
information or modify message contents.
12. Send back captured messages using Python script messages
to change data content.
13. Manipulate client-server interactions.
14. Check the receipt of the repetition messages.
15. Log the capability of attack.
Expected
Result
Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

As we expected we successfully caused the device to roam to a fake
core network by impersonating a gateway that looks legitimate to the
device (3GPP, 2002).
We found that known MITM attack vectors do capitalize on (i.e. AP or
fake AP capability) and that the Proxy tool or sniffer is required to
determine if vulnerable and OpenBTS roaming.
We gained the understanding that the capability of an intruder to put
itself in between the target user and is a genuine threat in M2M as
described by past research. The ability to eavesdrop, modify, delete, reorder, replay, and spoof signaling and user data messages is possible
(Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 2013).
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Buffer Overflows
Test 15
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

We directed Test 15 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs and
lack of binary protections.
The difficulty of a buffer overflow condition as described by (Hagar,
2013).
The application framework of all devices manages the functions that
perform various tasks, like resource management and call
management. When an erroneous condition, such as a buffer
overflow, occurs, the device processing power is stressed beyond the
boundaries of the store data buffer limits. This condition leads to extra
data overwriting and failure of the device processor’s memory
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locations, which causes the device to fail (Shewale, Patil, Deshmukh
& Singh, 2014).
Issue
Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result

Literature states that buffer overflow condition attacks corrupt data,
crash the programs, or cause the execution of malicious code.
As we understand the description by Hagar (2013), we tried to cause a
strange error messages by sending data and messages to various
abbreviations of application program interfaces (APIs) of the devices.
All APIs are designed to have length constraints for the utilization of
storage, data locations, and code. These constraints define execution
space. We tried to find any vulnerabilities that enable the execution of
applications without proper authentication by exploiting the buffers,
requesting additional header handling, and overflowing the
authentication handling of the device.
All
Access control, application security, application environment, and
security controls (CISSP, 2014)
Application service provider
Application security framework
1. Start the wireless interface in monitor mode on the specific
API channel or port.
2. Test the injection capability of the wireless device by sending
data to the API.
3. Using open source injection tools such as airodump, aireplay,
and aircrack, test and confirm the API can be injected prior to
proceeding. If it cannot be, change API ports.
4. Use correct authentication credentials in the messages for
baseline results.
5. Use fake authentication credentials in the messages document
results.
6. In a requested replay mode, inject packets.
7. Increase packet injection until device fails.
8. Collect error messages.
We expected that the exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities do
at some point exposed vulnerabilities. What is important is at what point
and the measurement of “ease of action” of the testing. It was also
expected that the buffer overflow will happen at the point the message is
received and the device tried to store the message.
We found that no buffer overflow was found or actually detected.
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Knowledge
Gained

Knowledge gained concluded that there is a possibility that the
communications module used has a limited buffer and the header size
and bigger files will cause a buffer overflow.

New
Requirement.

Limiting the buffer size and using a GET method with short answers for
all request and using AT commands for HTTP communication might
correct this vulnerability.

False Data Injection
Test 16
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

We directed Test 16 towards poor authorization and authentication,
client side injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs.
The difficulty of false data injection as described (Lu, Lin, Zhu, Liang,
& Shen, 2012)
According to Lu et al. (2012), networks and devices like M2M are
seriously threatened by false data injection attacks. These attacks
threaten authentication if they discover the capability of bypassing
administrative privileges, can discover and view sensitive information,
and can alter contents in a database.
We found that the issue is that if the availability of data is compromised,
the authentication processes may be defeated. In that case, all sensitive
information on the device is at risk.
We researched the extent to which one may use the remote command
execution technique to send mass injections to a device by sending
simple text-based attacks as an injection vector. The goal was to
understand the risk associated with injection flaws sent to and from
untrusted application and devices.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014)
M2M application service provider, manufacturer of M2M devices
and/or M2M gateways, M2M service provider, and user/consumer
CSE, Mca-reference point, and Mcc-reference point
1. Start the wireless interface in monitor mode on the specific
wireless GSM channel.
2. Use NowSMS as a tool to send a simple, text-based injection
from the command line.
3. Test the injection capability of the wireless device from the
gateway.
4. Use command line messaging to send fake authentication
credentials.
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5. Send simple, text-based syntax to the device interpreter.
6. As an injection vector, use untrusted data to seek injection
flaws.
7. Collect all new unique errors from both Wireshark and
NowSMS.
8. Make various API requests in replay mode to insert injected
packets within application.
9. Collect results and evaluate risk.
Expected
Result

Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

We expected that injection attacks would be mitigated by simple
authentication. However, it is unknown: a) if the small size, low power,
and unattended operations make a false data injection a higher risk and
b) what other attacks can be launched by a compromised M2M device.
We found that various forms of side-channel attacks can be tested
against the devices.
We gained knowledge that after running several Python script that
should have cause fault injection they freeze the RPi CPU. The timing
attack however is inclusive based on the how long the device takes to
execute commands when the Fault Injection script is running.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Session Management
Test 17
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

We directed Test 17 towards poor authorization and authentication and
improper session handling.
Tested is session management and broken authentication as described
by (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013)
According to Okugawa, Masutani, and Yoda (2005), M2M networks
may be self-organizing and composed of scattered small mobile devices
that require the survivability of simultaneous communicating endpoints.
The identity of the device is a key to managing the moving part. If the
session management or authentication is broken, all ecosystem functions
are at risk of attack (Lake, et al., 2013).
The issue is that vulnerabilities in session authentication protocols lead
to integrity and privacy issues because of key exchange failures and
setup integrity flaws. These flaws fail at session shutdown and within
authentication schemes such as logout, account update, and session
timeout.
We tested the device methods of ensuring key privacy and verified that
exploitation is of at least average difficulty and that “leaks or flaws in
the authentication or session management functions” can be addressed
by verifying that there are no exposed accounts, passwords, or session

124

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result
Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement.

IDs as described by Lake, et al., (2013) and oneM2M, (2013; 2014).
All
Integrity, availability, access control, communication channels, network
attacks, encryption concepts, and resource protection (CISSP, 2014)
Manufacturer of M2M devices, M2M gateways, device/gateway
management entities, M2M service provider, and user/consumer
Key management and protocol architecture
1. Using tools like Backtrack, target the device over an IP
session.
2. Monitor the wireless interface normal session.
3. Capture the messaging traffic sent to the gateway.
4. Intercept all data that can be used to execute the attack.
5. Get the session ID.
6. Inspect the logs for any session tokens.
7. The device should be using an expiration timeout that can be
located in the session token. Verify that the token is
cryptographically protected from tampering.
8. Using the injection test to confirm injection.
We expected that no data would be visible other than the authenticated
data that should be visible on the device after the termination of the
session. The same results were expected on the gateway side after
session termination, when all data is removed from the logs after an
inactivity timeout, complete reboot.
We found that the man in the middle attacks and false base station
proves vulnerability when using known network authentication.
We gained the knowledge that the main function of the communication
module is to authentication, send and receive data. As know the GSM
software network comments show the same probable security functions
for mobility and session management as commercial network, thus have
the same vulnerabilities.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Security Misconfiguration
Test 18
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?

We directed Test 18 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs,
transport layer protection and improper session handling
The security misconfiguration results on the device as described by
(Hongsong, Zhongchuan, & Dongyan, 2011).
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Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

If a device’s security is misconfigured, then various events can take
place that may hinder the device’s performance. Distributed values and
functions may be directly affected such as device health, remote control,
management, and the embedded applications’ restrictive security model.
M2M services have to support evolving requirements and dynamically
involve activities such as unsigned applications permission, unprotected
APIs, and non-protected registry keys (Drira, 2010).
We found that the issue is that misconfiguration attacks exploit
configuration weaknesses that can fail account access protections,
expose-patching flaws, compromise “unprotected files and directories,
and grant unauthorized access to the device” (oneM2M, 2014). Most
devices are provided “off-the-shelf” with unnecessary and unsafe
features that are enabled by default, including backdoor accounts,
special access mechanisms, and incorrect permissions.
We researched the device security configuration by reviewing the
unauthorized access to sensitive information security policies. Attempt
to compromise the device and M2M System by gaining unauthorized
access to or knowledge of device accounts, applications, and platform.
All
Availability, access control, application environment and security
controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information systems, and
patch and vulnerability management (CISSP, 2014)
M2M application service provider, device, and user/consumer
Security policies, including policy execution, default value protection,
and application roles
1. Test the security policies framework.
2. Research indicative security vulnerabilities from the outside
in by examining application binaries for unprotected
conditions.
3. Test and verify that the device interface controls
automatically logout of all sessions.
4. Test session termination after a given amount of time without
activity (session timeout).
5. Document results.
We expected that the accessible device environments are easy to exploit,
that all applications have permission to run, that based configuration
files are not properly locked down, that clear text reveals username and
password type data, and that database connection strings are set to
default settings in configuration.
We found that because the devices are built prototypes, services and
application can be turning off and on because the root logon/password is
known. This might not be the situation on a commercial device.
We gained knowledge that several design and development-related
vulnerabilities can be found if services are on and not secure. And that
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New
Requirement.

the vulnerabilities of misconfiguration and administration errors, should
show in the logs.
Detailed in Chapter 4.

Insecure Cryptographic Storage
Test 19
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?

We directed Test 19 towards broken cryptography.
The possibility of and damage from insecure cryptographic storage as
described by (Hussen, 2013)

Overview

According to Hussen (2013), M2M devices lack secure authentication,
session key exchange schemes, and adequate cryptographic storage for
small packet transmission. M2M devices lack these because the devices
have low power requirements, insufficient processing ability, and
associated resource constraints.
We find that the issue is that M2M devices have weak cryptographic
algorithms and lack the power to decipher cipher text, which is what
makes cryptanalysis successful.
We tested the ability and ease of finding keys, viewing clear text copies
of data, and accessing channels automatically without decrypting data.
We wanted to understand how the device is encrypting data, how it is
generating and storing safe keys, and what algorithms are deployed for
secure cryptographic storage.
All

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment
and security controls, and encryption concepts (CISSP, 2014)
Service provider, network operator, and user/consumer
Cryptographic architectural framework
1. Use scanning suites and packet sniffers to analyze protocol
messaging.
2. Execute cryptanalysis on applications via error logs and on
messages via scanner.
3. Separate plaintexts from any cipher texts.
4. Try to find the secret key and key storage area.
5. Break down and distinguish each algorithm’s output.
6. Test the functionality of equivalent algorithms for encryption
and decryption.
7. Review information from all error messages and other
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descriptive messages.
8. Observe message patterns.
9. Perform formal analysis of protocols.
10. Document the outcome and disclosure of all sensitive
information.
Expected
Result

Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

We expected that cryptanalysis would prove the need for new methods
to protect message context and secure plaintext data transport. The
devices lack encryption algorithms that do not require key sizes, and
these are important for keeping data confidential.
We found that due to the mobility characteristic of devices they run
mobile application that carry the same vulnerabilities known to past
researcher, requiring protection of the application, the user data and
system data.
The removable storage device is not secure.

Invalid Input Data
Test 20
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?
Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain

We directed Test 20 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs.
The validation of input data as required to ensure content in order to
provide proper applications security (Ellinas, Panayiotou, Kyriakides, &
Polycarpou, 2015)
It is important that M2M devices and gateways have the functionality to
detect and prevent unauthorized access to the ecosystem. In the case of
ecosystem federation, there is the possibility to have non-existent
communications security between devices, due to lack of requirements
requiring protection with mutual authentication so add protections
against invalid input data and strict parameters that outline qualifiers,
range, and data fields is required.
We found the issue to be that the injection of specific exploits such as
buffer overflows, SQL injections, and cross-site scripting will grant
access to the device and gateway’s functionality and privilege
escalation.
We tested the ability of using invalid input data to gain control of the
device. Analyze the difficulty to impose a Denial of Service, bypass
authentication, and escalate privileges by accessing unintended
functionality, executing remote code, and stealing data.
All
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP,
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Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result
Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained
New
Requirement.

2014)
M2M application service provider, user/consumer
Messaging architecture, security architecture
1. Use a remote access tool such as NowSMS.
2. Validate input vulnerabilities by causing a device crash or
DoS attack.
3. Send an SMS message to the device with execution scripts
that are embedded with other exaction code, such as
“location request.”
4. Note and verify that the device OS and application require
sufficient privileges to execute a script.
5. Note and verify that the applications are protected against
malicious written scripts that include rogue strict type
characters and lack encoding enforcement.
6. Ensure that all message content is delivered to the device and
then sanitized against unacceptable content specification.
7. Perform input validation by reviewing all error logs.
8. Perform output validation by reviewing all error logs.
9. Verify that session tokens function correctly.
10. Document that all privilege constraints are authorized and in
policy.
As we expected the input data sets do at some point fail the device and
that sending misleading data to the device might cause a DoS.
We found that sensitive data from applications such as passwords and
account information can be stored on an external card without OS
warning the user of this occurring, this should be protected or prohibited
on commercial devices. Also the investigation of AT COMMANDS
used as invalid data should be further studied.
Detailed in Chapter 4.
Presented in Chapter 4.
Note: For mitigation, stronger message authentication is required and
lightweight encryption should be used to provide secrecy (Shah, Perrig,
& Sinopoli, 2008; Awad, 2015).

Cross Scripting
Test 21
What Is
Tested and
Analyzed?

We directed Test 21 towards improper session handling, client side
injection and transport layer protection.
Cross scripting towards a device as described by (Gyrard, Bonnet, &
Boudaoud, 2014)
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Overview

Issue

Description

Impacted Use
Cases
Affected
Security
Domain
Affected
Stakeholders
Architecture
Impact
Action

Expected
Result

The M2M ecosystem passes communications over various networks.
The devices are capable of sending messages and data using protocols
such as HTTP or SIP. Thus, cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks may
target events and allow for code or data injection that disrupts the
communication path of the device (Siewruk, Sredniawa, Grabowski, &
Legierski, 2013).
Literature explains the issues as the feasibility to use forbidden
commands to bypass filters on a device using alternate forms of
messaging syntax, which will cause the device to fail when processing.
We tested for protocol weaknesses by using a cross-site scripting
process by executing arbitrary commands from SMS messages and AT
Commands.
All
Communication channels, network attacks, application security,
application environment, and security controls (CISSP, 2014)
Service provider, M2M gateways, and user/consumer
Protocols and the method of implementations of applications.
1. Using browser technologies that allow client side scripting,
create various file submissions that will be sent from the
control center to the device.
2. Design and utilize characters type changes, such as SMS
messaging, to test coding security enforcement.
3. Deliver to the device to prove that the present protocols are
functioning correctly against acceptable content
specification.
4. Ensure that all content coming from the device uses the
correct encoding for message reply.
5. Document the application response and delivery for timing,
structure, and content correctness.
6. Using the control center device management tools, apply
messaging filtering.
7. Rerun messaging test.
8. Perform input validation for all remote content that includes
automated remote and user-generated content.
9. Document the output validation for all content.
As expected we found that ability to bypass filters where “scripts” are
executed is a prohibited functionality. All input from the server side do
validate. The data-input did not fail the device. The device validation
application did prevent and protect unauthorized input from infecting
other on-board applications.
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Actual Result

Knowledge
Gained

New
Requirement

We found that the detection of potential cross site scripting, verbose
errors and forceful browsing are aspects and typically identified with
automated tool, however not a good test against devices. .
When looking at cross-site scripting (XSS) and how this attacks a web
application with data send malicious code must be use. When testing
this in the form of a browser side script, the flaws allow attacks to input
data and the user may see the output if it is generated without validating,
further testing and planning for this type of attacked is required for
devices. But for M2M devices there is no end user to view the output.
Only specific types of data may be authorized to be sent to and from the
M2M devices.
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